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The False Dichotomy Between
Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks
JAKE LINFORD
Classifying a trademark as descriptive rather than suggestive
fundamentally alters the scope of trademark protection. A descriptive
mark, derived from a feature of the product or service sold, only
qualifies for protection after the mark has acquired source significance,
i.e., consumers see it as a trademark. A suggestive trademark, which
indirectly invokes qualities of the product or service, is protected
without evidence of source significance. Courts often struggle to
distinguish between suggestive and descriptive marks. The effort would
nevertheless be reasonable if the differences between suggestive and
descriptive marks justified their disparate legal treatment. But in light
of cognitive and historical research into language change, protecting a
suggestive mark without evidence of source significance may not be
warranted.
In fact, trademark law erroneously inflates the difference between
suggestive and descriptive marks. This mistake becomes apparent in
light of theoretical, historical, and cognitive research into “semantic
shift”: the process by which words gain and lose meaning over time.
Linguistic analysis reveals an inconsistency between how trademark
doctrine treats suggestive and descriptive trademarks and how
consumers likely process them. Suggestive and descriptive marks are
not so dissimilar as to justify different treatment. Instead, they likely
influence consumers in similar ways. As a result, trademark law should
reposition the line between descriptive and suggestive trademarks. A
suggestive mark, like a descriptive mark, should be protected only upon
a showing that the mark has developed source significance in the minds
of consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In trademark law, much depends on the relationship between the word
chosen as a trademark and the product sold under the mark.1 A firm might
choose a mark derived from a quality or feature of the product sold—like
SEALTIGHT for fasteners.2 The firm cannot acquire protection in this
“descriptive” mark unless it can provide evidence that consumers see the word
as a source signifier which tells them this product with this name comes from a
single source.3
A firm might instead choose a “suggestive” mark that indirectly invokes a
quality or feature of the product sold—like GLEEM for toothpaste.4 The firm
can acquire protection in the suggestive mark upon the first use of the mark in
commerce, whether or not the firm has evidence that consumers see the word as
a trademark.5 A suggestive mark is protected upon first use without evidence of

1 See, e.g., Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic”
Trademarks, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110, 113 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, “Generic”
Trademarks].
2 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001).
3 A trademark is distinctive or source signifying and thus protectable if consumers are
likely to perceive that it “identifies goods or services produced or sponsored by a particular
person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
The person or firm may be unknown to the consumer. Suggestive marks are treated as
inherently distinctive upon first use, id., but descriptive marks must show that the mark has
become distinctive, or acquired “secondary meaning” in the eyes of consumers, id. § 13(b).
Even if the firm proves its descriptive mark has acquired trademark meaning, courts still
presume the mark is weak. See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d
966, 974 (11th Cir. 1983) (“A descriptive mark . . . is considered weak and is given a ‘narrow
range of protection.’” (quoting 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 11:24, at 398 (1973))).
4 See B & B Hardware, 252 F.3d at 1012; Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with
Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 771 (1990).
5 See, e.g., John H. Harland, 711 F.2d at 974 (“[A] suggestive mark can be protected
without evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a).
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source significance because such a mark is presumed to be “inherently
distinctive,”6 i.e., innately capable of representing the source of a product.7
The distinction between suggestive and descriptive can shape the outcome
of trademark litigation,8 but distinguishing suggestive from descriptive marks is
often difficult. Courts and scholars describe the suggestive–descriptive line as
“nearly incapable of precise description”;9 “not always clear”;10 “shadowy”;11
“murky”;12 “wholly lacking . . . in distinctiveness”;13 “difficult . . . to draw”;14
“frequently difficult to apply”;15 uncertain and impossible to extrapolate from
precedent;16 and “almost impossible to define in the abstract.”17 Frequently,
classifying a mark as either suggestive or descriptive is a decision “made on an
intuitive basis rather than as the result of a logical analysis susceptible of
6 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (stating
that “because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product,
[suggestive marks] are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection” without
evidence of source significance). Some courts also presume that a suggestive mark is strong.
See, e.g., Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the suggestive mark of the smaller junior user was inherently distinctive
and thus deserved “broad protection”); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527
(4th Cir. 1984) (stating that suggestive marks are also considered “strong” as well as
“presumptively valid” (quoting Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp.
777, 780 (S.D.N.Y.1981))). But see Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 385
(2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of any showing of secondary meaning, suggestive marks are
at best moderately strong.”); John H. Harland, 711 F.2d at 974 (“[A]lthough a suggestive
mark can be protected without evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning, [it] is
comparatively weak.” (footnote omitted)).
7 Throughout the text, when I say product, I mean good(s) or service(s), but use product
(singular) to simplify.
8 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 56–79 and accompanying text.
9 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025,
1033 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786,
790 (5th Cir. 1983) (“These categories, like the tones in a spectrum, tend to blur at the edges
and merge together. The labels are more advisory than definitional, more like guidelines than
pigeonholes.”); infra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.
10 Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th
Cir. 1979).
11 Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1188 (1948).
12 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product
Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 519 (1997) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Inherent
Distinctiveness].
13 Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585,
597 n.95 (2002).
14 Carter, supra note 4, at 771.
15 Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980).
16 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other
grounds by Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).
17 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 11:64 (4th ed. 2008).
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articulation.”18 The inquiry would nevertheless be worth the trouble if it was
clear that the differences between suggestive and descriptive marks justify the
disparate results we see in the law. In other words, the suggestive–descriptive
line is justifiable if consumers are in fact likely to perceive a suggestive mark as
inherently source signifying.
The creation of trademark meaning often involves adding a new sense to an
existing word. Most word marks, including suggestive and descriptive marks,
appropriate pre-existing words to bear source-signifying meaning.19 Trademark
law denies protection to descriptive marks without evidence of source
significance because the mark is derived from a feature of the product and thus
is presumed unlikely to stand out as a trademark.20 On the other hand, trademark
doctrine presumes that consumers see suggestive marks as inherently distinctive
because there is a weak connection between the mark selected and the product
sold.21 The law presumes this weak connection leaves consumers with no choice
but to make an “imaginative leap” to connect the mark with the designated
product.22 But there is evidence that the connection between a suggestive mark
and the product sold are closer than the law recognizes. This Article marshals
etymological,23 theoretical, and cognitive literatures on semantic shift—the way
words add and lose meaning over time24—to argue that a suggestive mark is
much more like a descriptive mark than the law currently recognizes. The
suggestive–descriptive distinction is thus illusory at best.
18 Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976).
19 See infra notes 42–55 and accompanying text.
20 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING

PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (July 2015) [hereinafter TMEP] (“Suggestive marks . . . when
applied to the goods or services at issue, require imagination, thought, or perception to reach
a conclusion as to the nature of those goods or services. . . . [A] descriptive
term . . . immediately tells something about the goods or services.”).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that BIHARI INTERIORS is suggestive rather than descriptive because consumers are
required to make “an imaginative leap” to correctly identify plaintiff’s interior design
services); see also, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding ROACH MOTEL for insect traps at least suggestive, if not arbitrary,
because of the incongruity between the concept of a motel, where guests are welcomed, and
what type of motel might be built for roaches, who are usually unwelcome guests); Stix
Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“A
term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as
to the nature of goods. A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”).
23 Etymology, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
64893 [http://perma.cc/X8JZ-VE4V] (“The facts relating to the origin of a particular word
or the historical development of its form and meaning; the origin of a particular word.”).
24 While this Article uses the term semantic shift, other scholars refer to these
phenomena as semantic change, semantic progression, or semantic drift. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT & RICHARD B. DASHER, REGULARITY IN SEMANTIC CHANGE 1
(2002).
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The semantic shift literature indicates that the law may systematically
overestimate the ability of a suggestive mark to clearly communicate that it
serves as a trademark while simultaneously underestimating the processing
advantages provided to a firm that selects a suggestive mark. Semantic shift
research explains how words with multiple related meanings confer processing
advantages that make it easier for readers and listeners to slide from one
meaning to another. Readers and listeners process words with multiple related
meanings more quickly and more efficiently than words with multiple unrelated
meanings, or with only a single meaning. Whether the relationship between two
words is metonymic (where a feature of a thing is used as the name of the thing,
like “Green Beret” for members of the U.S. Army Special Forces)25 or
metaphoric (where one thing stands in for another with similar qualities, like
“lip” for the edge of a cup),26 the relationship is “cognitively efficient,” helping
the reader resolve ambiguity by channeling the reader’s cognitive processes
from one connected meaning to another.27 Language change tends to follow this
cognitively efficient route.28 The metaphoric connection between a suggestive
mark and the product offered may thus benefit from similar processing
advantages as the metonymic connection between a descriptive mark and its
associated product.29 A suggestive mark is thus less likely to stand out as a
source signifier than the law presumes. In light of these findings, this Article
argues that the current line between suggestive and descriptive marks is
incorrectly drawn.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II describes the current approach
to categorizing suggestive and descriptive marks, most famously summarized in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.30 The Abercrombie spectrum
is often criticized, but the standard critiques are unsatisfying. Those critiques
fail to recognize how initial consumer perception of the connection between
different meanings of a word shapes how trademark meaning is accessed,
25 See, e.g., René Dirven, Metaphor As a Basic Means for Extending the Lexicon, in

THE UBIQUITY OF METAPHOR: METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 85, 97 (Wolf
Paprotté & René Dirven eds., 1985).
26 Ekaterini Klepousniotou, Reconciling Linguistics and Psycholinguistics: On the
Psychological Reality of Linguistic Polysemy, in THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF POLYSEMY: NEW
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE FOR THEORIES OF WORD MEANING 17, 27 (Marina Rakova et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Klepousniotou, Reconciling].
27 See infra Part III.C.
28 See infra Part III.B.
29 A metonymic relationship is one where a feature of a thing is used for the name of
the thing, like SEALTIGHT as a trademark for fasteners, based on a quality one would
expect a fastener to have. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012
(8th Cir. 2001). Suggestive marks are instead metaphorically related to the good or service
sold, like using GLEEM to sell toothpaste indirectly invokes the bright, shiny quality one
could expect from thoroughly cleaned teeth. PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d
558, 563 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Carter, supra note 4, at 771). These relationships are
discussed more fully in Part IV, infra.
30 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976).
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processed, and understood. To fill this gap, this Article looks to semantic shift
research to understand how the connection between words cabins the
communicative capacity of a mark and sets a baseline for the development of
source significance. This Article is the first to apply semantic shift research to
analyze how the perceived connection between descriptive, suggestive, and
arbitrary marks and the products associated with those marks can shape
consumer perception.31 Part III offers an abbreviated account of research into
semantic shift and provides background for the subsequent critique of the false
dichotomy between suggestive and descriptive trademarks. Part IV applies those
linguistic accounts to provide a limited defense of the Abercrombie spectrum,
and to critique the suggestive–descriptive line in trademark law. In many
respects, the Abercrombie spectrum properly sorts trademarks to reflect
processing advantages identified in the semantic shift literature. But the legal
distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks ignores the similarities
between metonymic and metaphoric polysemy. Both descriptive and suggestive
marks have a polysemous relationship with the good or service sold. Both marks
thus provide processing advantages that reduce cognitive workload compared
to other categories of trademarks. In light of this insight, the stark divide
between suggestive and descriptive trademarks is not justified. The inherent
distinctiveness line in trademark law should be redrawn, and a suggestive mark

31 See also generally Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1. Linguistics—the
study of symbols and their meanings—has made limited inroads in the analysis of trademark
law and policy, but in subfields other than semantic shift. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic
Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) (applying a branch of
linguistics, semiotics, or the study of signs, to trademark law and arguing that the “grammar
[of trademark law] must be understood not simply in economic, but also in linguistic terms”);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law, in TRADE MARKS AND
BRANDS 140, 157 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that while trademark law should
not become beholden to linguistics, linguistic principles are embedded in trademark law, and
linguistic theory can provide a means for uncovering “the inevitably prescriptive content of
supposedly descriptive assessments of trademark claims”); Alan Durant, ‘How Can I Tell
the Trade Mark on a Piece of Gingerbread from All the Other Marks on It?’ Naming and
Meaning in Verbal Trade Mark Signs, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS, supra, at 107, 132
(suggesting that pragmatics and discourse analysis, the “branches of linguistics that
investigate language in use,” are most likely to contribute to our understanding of the
important issues in trademark law); Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand
Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 77 (2014) (analyzing trademark dilution and genericness
in light of psycholinguistics literature on semantic ambiguity resolution); Laura A.
Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1320–21 (2010)
(arguing that incorporating linguistic theory on language formation can help trademark law
better reflect consumers’ perceptions of language); Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and
Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1068–
69 (2009) (applying psychological and brand perception literature to challenge Beebe’s
semiotic analysis); Regan Smith, Note, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for
Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007) (applying
semiotic theory to argue for reforming the scandalous marks prohibition in trademark law).
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should be protected only if the mark owner can provide evidence of source
significance.

II. THE CAPRICIOUS SUGGESTIVE–DESCRIPTIVE DICHOTOMY
This Article presumes, without deciding, that the dominant economic
justification provides a proper normative basis for trademark law.32 Under the
economic rationale, the law protects a trademark as a unique source identifier
so that consumers can more easily find a product from their preferred source.33
Protecting a trademark from infringement reduces consumer search costs to the
extent it prevents competitors from adopting a mark that would confuse
consumers about the source of the competitor’s product.
The economic justification also ostensibly provides the normative basis for
the suggestive–descriptive line. Under the economic rationale, a trademark is
protected because—and protectable to the extent that—the mark is “distinct
from the product it brands and . . . [also] conveys information about that separate
product.”34 Trademark law divides word marks into two groups35: those that are
inherently distinctive (including suggestive marks), and those that are not
(including descriptive marks).36 Suggestive marks are presumed inherently
distinctive, protectable from first use in commerce, and often treated as
inherently strong. On the other hand, descriptive marks are not protectable
unless the mark owner can provide evidence of source significance or secondary
meaning, and even then are presumed to be weaker than other trademarks.
Trademark theory assumes that a descriptive term fails, on first use, to
distinguish itself from the product it brands because of the relatively
32 Trademark law embraces at least two categories of normative justifications that are

somewhat in tension with one another: economic justifications that focus primarily on
reducing consumer search costs; and moral justifications that include preventing injury to or
misappropriation of mark owner goodwill and deception of consumers. For a description of
the tension between these normative bases for trademark protection, see, for example, Robert
G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible
Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1311–12, 1335, 1350
(2012) [hereinafter Bone, Taking].
33 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (arguing that the historical
normative goal of trademark law is to foster the flow of information in markets, thereby
reducing search costs for consumers). But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (2007) (noting that
while the dominant view is that “trademark law’s core policies [are] protecting consumers
and improving the quality of information in the marketplace,” a historical examination of
early trademark cases instead reveals that courts embraced a natural rights theory of
trademark property, protecting mark owners from suffering diversion of consumers).
34 Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 190 (2007).
35 This Article limits its analysis to word marks and does not consider the scope of
protection for non-word trademarks like colors, images, or trade dress.
36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
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straightforward connection between the mark and the good sold. Furthermore,
selecting a descriptive mark may provide the mark owner with a troubling
advantage over competitors. The mark owner may use the descriptive mark to
prevent competitors from effectively communicating with consumers,
essentially “free riding” on the connection between the product and the mark.
Thus a mark owner cannot secure protection in a descriptive mark unless there
is evidence that the mark has acquired source significance in the eyes of
consumers.
On the other hand, because consumers must make what courts call “an
imaginative leap” to connect the suggestive mark and the product sold,37
trademark doctrine presumes a suggestive mark is inherently distinctive. The
law assumes that the metaphoric connection between a suggestive mark and the
product offered is too attenuated to confer processing power. Thus, the law
presumes a suggestive mark is likely to stand out to consumers as a trademark,
and that consumers will treat it as such.
The line between the two categories is difficult to draw, but some courts and
commentators simplify the inquiry to questions of competitive necessity and the
potential harm of language depletion. As this Part explains, those issues cannot
be understood without recognizing what and how the mark communicates with
consumers, and how consumers process the information that the mark attempts
to convey.

A. Trademark Protection Along the Abercrombie Spectrum
Trademark law protects the exclusive use of a word only to the extent that
the word signifies a singular source for a product. The rules for how easily a
word can acquire protection as a trademark are based in large part on the
relationship between the word chosen as a trademark and the product sold under
that mark.38 In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., Judge Friendly
articulated a widely adopted spectrum that described the capability of a given
mark to acquire source significance, and thus trademark protection.39 As the
court stated in Abercrombie, the more inherently distinctive a mark, the more
readily it can bear source significance, and the easier it is for the hopeful mark
owner to acquire protection.40 The following table summarizes the current state
of the law.

37 See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
38 Potomac Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Takoma Acad. Alumni

Ass’n, Inc., Civ. Action No. DKC 13-1128, 2014 WL 857947, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014)
(“Whether an unregistered mark is protected under federal law depends upon its
classification—either as ‘generic,’ ‘descriptive,’ ‘suggestive,’ or ‘arbitrary/fanciful.’” (citing
U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com, Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir. 2002))).
39 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976).
40 Id.
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Table 1: Presumed Protectability and Strength Based on Position Along
Abercrombie Spectrum
Abercrombie Category
(relationship between mark
and product)
Fanciful mark:
Coined for use as a
trademark, not derived from a
pre-existing word
Ex.: XEROX for photocopiers
Arbitrary mark:
Derived from a pre-existing
word that has no connection
with the product
Ex.: APPLE for computers
Suggestive mark:
Pre-existing word with some
connection to the product, via
an imaginative leap
Ex.: SKINVISIBLE for
transparent adhesive
bandages; GLEEM for
toothpaste
Descriptive mark:
Pre-existing term with a clear
connection to the product
sold, via a direct description
of a product feature
Ex.: SEALTIGHT for
fasteners
Ex ante generic mark:
Word whose meaning has
shifted from a class of
products, to one particular
brand
Ex.: HOG for Harley
Davidson motorcycles denied
protection, despite evidence
of source significance, on
grounds of trademark
incapacity

Protectability

Inherent Strength

Presumed strong
Inherently
protectable on first
use
Varies—some courts
presume suggestive
marks are weaker
than arbitrary /
fanciful marks

Protectable only
with evidence of
source significance

Presumed weak

Unprotectable,
even with evidence
of source
significance

Not considered
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Marks that are inherently distinctive qualify for protection without proof of
source significance or secondary meaning.41 As described along the
Abercrombie spectrum, the strongest marks have no inherent relationship to the
product sold. A fanciful mark is a made-up word, like XEROX for photocopiers.
An arbitrary mark is derived from a pre-existing but unrelated word, like APPLE
for computers. Both fanciful and arbitrary marks are considered strong and
protected from the first use in commerce.42
Like arbitrary and fanciful marks, suggestive marks are treated as
presumptively valid, and thus protectable without evidence of secondary
meaning.43 The first use of an inherently distinctive mark is treated as source
signifying on the theory that consumers who see a word that doesn’t describe
the product will presume the word was meant to serve as a trademark and treat
it like one.44 As articulated in Abercrombie, a suggestive mark is treated as
inherently distinctive because it hints at the quality or characteristic of the good
without actually describing it.45 A suggestive mark does not directly identify a
feature of the product in question, but the suggestive mark “requires the
consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as to the nature of
the[] goods [offered].”46
Unlike the aforementioned marks, descriptive terms more directly refer to a
quality or characteristic of the product with which the mark is associated.47 For
example, a term like SEALTIGHT for fasteners describes qualities that a
fastener would likely have, and the claimed mark is treated as directly related to
the product designated. Due in part to an underlying suspicion that control of
descriptive terms would make it more costly for competitors to enter the

41 See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984).
42 See also infra Part IV.A.1–2.
43 Some courts treat suggestive marks as inherently distinctive but also weaker than

arbitrary or fanciful marks. Compare M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073,
1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that suggestive marks, like descriptive marks, are “conceptually
weak”), with Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527 (stating that suggestive marks are also
considered “strong” as well as “presumptively valid” (quoting Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany
Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 780 (S.D.N.Y.1981))).
44 Bone, Taking, supra note 32, at 1313 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000)).
45 Suggestive marks were also a late addition to trademark law. See Abercrombie, 537
F.2d at 10 (“The category of ‘suggestive’ marks was spawned by the felt need to accord
protection to marks that were neither exactly descriptive on the one hand nor truly fanciful
on the other . . . .”).
46 Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1528); see also TMEP, supra note 20, § 1209.01(a) (“Suggestive
marks . . . when applied to the goods or services at issue, require imagination, thought, or
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of those goods or services. . . . [A]
descriptive term . . . immediately tells something about the goods or services.”).
47 Thomas McCarthy has described the difference between descriptive and suggestive
marks as “no more objective and free of personal predilections than a test which asks persons
to divide all color shades into ‘light’ and ‘dark.’” MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 11:71.
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market,48 a descriptive term is not considered inherently distinctive, and will not
be protected unless the mark owner establishes that the term has acquired source
significance or secondary meaning.49
A descriptive mark acquires source significance when it becomes
sufficiently distinctive to establish “a mental association in buyers’ minds
between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.”50 Without proof
of source significance, a descriptive trademark does not merit protection, and a
court will not inquire whether an alleged infringer’s use of a similar mark on
similar products is likely to confuse consumers.51 To determine whether a mark
has acquired source significance, courts and examiners look for evidence that
the mark has come to represent the source of the product.52 While it can be
difficult to establish source significance, it is not impossible. For example,
COCA-COLA has been frequently cited as the “paradigm of a descriptive mark
that has acquired a secondary meaning.”53
Finally, a generic term is not protectable, even if it acquires secondary
meaning.54 Courts and scholars presume that any word that has once served as
the name of a product may not function as a source signifying mark for that
category of product. Under this doctrine of trademark incapacity, also known as
the doctrine of de facto secondary meaning, trademark protection is denied even

48 Stephanie M. Greene, Sorting Out “Fair Use” and “Likelihood of Confusion” in
Trademark Law, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 43, 70–72 (2006) (arguing that allowing a monopoly of a
descriptive term creates a barrier to entry because a potential competitor cannot use the
descriptive term and therefore must expend more effort to communicate with and attract
consumers).
49 See, e.g., Larsen v. Terk Techs. Corp., 151 F.3d 140, 148 (4th Cir. 1998).
50 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 15:5; see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,
81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “secondary meaning” exists when, “in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself” (quoting Dayton Progress Corp. v. Lane
Punch Corp., 917 F.2d 836, 839 (4th Cir. 1990))); Wolf Appliance, Inc. v. Viking Range
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (“Secondary meaning arises when a mark
‘has been used so long and so exclusively by one company in association with its goods or
services that the word or phrase has come to mean that those goods or services are the
company’s trademark.’” (quoting Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 641 (7th
Cir. 2001))).
51 See, e.g., Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992).
52 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). Relevant evidence of
secondary meaning will include complaints by actual customers; surveys by relevant
potential consumers; advertising expenditures; sales volume; and length of use. See Jake
Linford, Trademark Owner As Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and Property
Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703, 728 (2013) [hereinafter Linford, Adverse
Possessor]. One can ask consumers about cola, and they will inevitably recognize Coca-Cola
as a distinctive brand, or one can look to sales and advertising, and Coca-Cola’s duration in
the marketplace as proxies for consumer perception.
53 Larsen, 151 F.3d at 148 n.7.
54 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
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when a mark owner presents otherwise overwhelming evidence that consumers
see the term predominantly as a trademark.55
The inquiry into protectability is context sensitive. A word or phrase can be
generic for one line of products, descriptive for a second, suggestive for a third,
and arbitrary for a fourth. For example, as one court noted, “HONEY BROWN
is generic in the context of ale beers, possibly descriptive in the context of lager
beers, or wood stains, and probably suggestive or arbitrary in the context of
grilling products, internet service providers, musical instruments, or paper
products.”56

B. The High Stakes of the Suggestive–Descriptive Line
Significant consequences turn on the suggestive–descriptive determination.
Owners whose marks are designated as descriptive face hurdles acquiring a usebased registration and an uphill battle enforcing their marks against alleged
infringers. Suggestive marks, however, qualify for registration without evidence
of secondary meaning and are often presumed not only inherently distinctive
but inherently strong. As this Section highlights, the consequences are drastic
for an inquiry that turns on such exceedingly fine distinctions.
Failing to present evidence of secondary meaning is of no consequence for
a suggestive mark, but results in loss or denial of protection for a descriptive
mark. For example, in American Express Marketing & Development Corp. v.
Black Card LLC, American Express challenged Black Card LLC’s registration
of BLACKCARD for credit and debit card services on descriptiveness
grounds.57 The court was persuaded that BLACKCARD was descriptive of a
premium grade of credit card.58 Thus, when Black Card LLC presented no
evidence of secondary meaning, the court ordered the cancellation of Black
Card LLC’s registration.59
Other trademark doctrines also turn in large part on the suggestive–
descriptive divide. For example, some mark owners claim a family of marks,
like McDonald’s Corporation’s MC- family of marks for restaurant food items.60
Scholars have argued that descriptive terms cannot constitute the common
55 But see generally Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1 (applying theories
of semantic shift to argue that generic terms should be allowed to obtain trademark protection
when there is sufficient evidence that consumers primarily perceive the term as a trademark).
56 Real News Project, Inc. v. Indep. World Television, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299,
1306 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted).
57 Am. Express Mktg. & Dev. Corp. v. Black Card LLC, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926,
1927 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The USPTO’s electronic search system reports that the
BLACKCARD mark was assigned to American Express. BLACKCARD, Registration No.
78717042.
58 Am. Express, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933.
59 Id. at 1934.
60 See, e.g., J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1463 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (holding that a formative like “Mc” need not operate as a trademark in order for
protection to extend to a family of marks).
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element of a family of marks.61 Other authorities have instead held that a
descriptive term can serve as the common element only when there is a strong
showing of secondary meaning.62 For instance, in Spraying Systems Co. v.
Delavan, Inc., plaintiff Spraying Systems sold a series of spray nozzle products
under a family of -JET marks, like TEEJET, AIRJET, and FOAMJET.63 The
court in Spraying Systems concluded the -JET suffix was descriptive, rather than
inherently distinctive, and rejected the plaintiff’s claims due to failure to
establish secondary meaning.64 Spraying Systems protested that in J & J Snack
Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., McDonald’s Corp. had successfully
defended its MC- family of marks without evidence of secondary meaning.65
The court in Spraying Systems distinguished J & J Snack Foods on the ground
that MC- was “inherently distinctive,” unlike -JET, and evidence of secondary
meaning was therefore not required.66
Other mark owners receive outsized benefit from a suggestiveness
determination. For example, in Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., the
court considered whether the mark 5-HOUR ENERGY for an “energy shot” was
descriptive or suggestive.67 Living Essentials, the mark owner’s predecessor in
interest, began marketing 5-HOUR ENERGY in 2005, shortly after the PTO
rejected its trademark application on descriptiveness grounds.68 In March 2006,
N.V.E. entered the energy shot market with 6 HOUR POWER.69 The district
court granted N.V.E.’s motion for summary judgment on Living Essential’s
claim of trademark infringement,70 finding no likelihood of confusion between
the products. As part of its analysis, the district court concluded 5-HOUR
ENERGY was a weak, descriptive mark,71 which was, from the court’s
perspective, “[p]ivotal” in its determination that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding likelihood of confusion.72
On appeal, N.V.E. argued that Living Essentials failed to establish
secondary meaning in the 5-HOUR ENERGY mark prior to N.V.E’s first use of

61 See, e.g., David J. Kera, Tips from the TTAB: Family of Marks, 67 TRADEMARK REP.

419, 420 (1977). Some authorities have articulated a similar rule. See, e.g., Cambridge Filter
Corp. v. Servodyne Corp., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 99, 103 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
62 See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Salsbury Labs., 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 250, 255
(T.T.A.B. 1970).
63 Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1992).
64 Id. at 396.
65 J & J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1463.
66 Spraying Sys., 975 F.2d at 395.
67 Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2012).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 728.
71 Id. at 729 (“[G]iven the descriptive nature of Plaintiff’s mark, i.e., that it provides
users with five hours of energy, the mark itself has little strength.” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting the district court opinion, 747 F. Supp. 2d 853, 868 (E.D. Mich. 2010))).
72 Id. at 731 (quoting 747 F. Supp. 2d at 871).
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the 6 HOUR POWER mark.73 If 5-HOUR ENERGY were descriptive, and if
Living Essentials could not establish secondary meaning, it could not prevail in
a claim that N.V.E.’s use of 6 HOUR POWER was likely to confuse
consumers.74 Instead, the court of appeals applied de novo review and
concluded that 5-HOUR ENERGY was suggestive. In reaching that conclusion,
the court noted that 5-HOUR ENERGY was suggestive because both the method
of energy transference and the type of energy transferred were potentially
ambiguous.75 Reasonable minds might disagree with the court’s determination,
but even if the court was straining to find that consumers must use “imagination
and perception to determine the nature of the goods,”76 the holding left Living
Essentials well-placed to proceed against N.V.E.
Likewise, in Menashe v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., a publicist and a fashion
model sought a declaratory judgment that their use of SEXY LITTLE THING
and SEXY LITTLE THINGS as a mark for lingerie was non-infringing.77
Victoria’s Secret had used SEXY LITTLE THINGS as a mark for lingerie prior
to the declaratory plaintiffs’ attempt to secure their own intent-to-use
application.78 But the plaintiffs claimed that SEXY LITTLE THINGS was
descriptive for lingerie and that Victoria’s Secret had not acquired secondary
meaning prior to plaintiffs’ first use.79 The court instead concluded that because
SEXY LITTLE THINGS was suggestive of Victoria’s Secret’s lingerie line, it
could establish priority without an inquiry into secondary meaning.80 Given the
short window between the parties’ entrance into the market, evidence of
secondary meaning might have been difficult to establish. Victoria’s Secret’s
priority win thus turned on the distinctiveness determination.
Courts have also noted, in disputes over whether alleged infringement will
confuse consumers, that if a mark is suggestive “there is a stronger likelihood
that a jury could reasonably conclude that the ‘strength of the mark’ factor” in
the test for likelihood of confusion favors the mark owner.81 For example, in
Wallach v. Longevity Network,82 the court gave little weight to survey evidence
that a petitioner’s mark had not acquired secondary meaning,83 concluding that
73 Innovation Ventures, 694 F.3d at 728–29.
74 Id. at 729 (citing Burke–Parsons–Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc.,

871 F.2d 590, 595–96 (6th Cir. 1989)).
75 Id. at 730 (proposing that energy transference might occur through injections, pills,
or exercise, and the energy transferred could be electrical or nuclear).
76 Id. (quoting Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th
Cir. 1984)).
77 Menashe v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
78 Id. at 417.
79 Id. at 422.
80 Id. at 425.
81 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025,
1034 (9th Cir. 2010); see also supra note 43.
82 Wallach v. Longevity Network, Ltd., No. CV 04-2404 SJO (RZx), 2005 WL
5958091, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005).
83 Id. at *13.
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petitioner’s mark LONGEVITY for nutritional supplements was both
incontestable and suggestive. The mark’s incontestable status insulated it from
a challenge based on descriptiveness, although the reach of the mark could still
be limited if it were deemed weak.84 But the court concluded the suggestiveness
of the mark itself was evidence that the mark was not weak.85
Any observer of trademark law can find cases where they believe a court
made a poor choice in policing the suggestive–descriptive line. The cases above
highlight some recent close calls, and the dramatic difference that hinges on
where the contested mark falls on the Abercrombie spectrum. The next Section
considers the difficulty in drawing the suggestive–descriptive line, and the tests
courts have applied in the attempt.

C. How Courts Distinguish Suggestive from Descriptive Trademarks
Distinguishing distinctive from descriptive marks is a difficult endeavor
with high stakes. Drawing the distinctiveness line comes down to a mix of two
factors. Courts inquire whether protection of the mark might cause language
depletion or otherwise harm competitors. They also ask how and what the mark
communicates to consumers. The following table summarizes the current state
of the law.

84 Id. at *14; see also Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 52, at 754 (describing a
split between the Courts of Appeals on whether an incontestable mark is entitled to a
presumption of strength).
85 Wallach, 2005 WL 5958091, at *12.
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Table 2: Standard Articulation of Differences Between Descriptive,
Suggestive, and Arbitrary Trademarks

Descriptive

Direct

Few

Significant

Suggestive

Indirect

More /
Many

Insignificant

Arbitrary

No
connection

Any word

None

Immediate
connection

High bar—
proof of
secondary
meaning
required

Indirect
connection;
imaginative
leap required
Incongruous;
no advantage

Low bar—
inherently
distinctive on
first use

1. Line Drawing Based on Language Depletion and Suitable
Replacement Marks
For many courts, policing the line between descriptive and suggestive marks
requires a judgment call about competitors’ need to use the mark.86
Appropriating a generic term may reduce the ability of competing firms to enter
the market or sell their product, because they cannot use terms they would prefer
to use to communicate with consumers.87 The same rationale animates
resistance to protection for descriptive marks. Courts assume that protecting a
descriptive term as a trademark may create a monopoly over a word that
competitors need to use.88 Courts express concern over the lack of suitable
substitutes. For example, in Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, the Ninth Circuit
noted that “[i]f the trademark holder were allowed exclusive rights” in
descriptive terms, “the language would be depleted in much the same way as if
generic words were protectable.”89
86 J. Janewa OseiTutu, A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: The Cultural
Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 147, 179 (2011).
87 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 292–93 (1987).
88 Perfect Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (noting that “the Second Circuit has also considered whether a finding that a mark is
inherently distinctive will make it difficult for manufacturers of similar products to market
their goods” (citing Abercrombie Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d. Cir.
1976))).
89 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting New
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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While courts express concern over language depletion, a certain level of
“language exclusivity” reduces consumer search costs.90 If the law secures the
ability of trademark owners to engage in relatively exclusive use of their
respective marks to identify their individual products, consumers can more
readily find the product they prefer to buy. Lower search costs can lead to more
competitive markets, because consumers can more easily find replacement
goods.91 Protection of a nondistinctive mark would not, however, lower search
costs, but would impose costs on competitors to the extent the non-distinctive
mark “uses words, symbols, shapes, or colors that are common to those used by
other producers” of a particular product.92
Some scholars see the danger of language depletion as directly related to the
perceived inherent strength of the different Abercrombie categories. For
example, Stephen Carter raises concerns that the farther along the Abercrombie
spectrum a mark is from a fanciful term, i.e., a made up word, the greater the
risk of language depletion.93 Some commentators thus assume that concerns
over language depletion will consistently arise with regard to descriptive marks,
but rarely if ever for arbitrary marks. For instance, William Landes and Richard
Posner assert that protection of descriptive terms may reduce welfare because
“[a] given product has only so many attributes that interest buyers.”94 On the
other hand, for arbitrary marks, the “450,000 words in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary . . . are freely substitutable if one is uninterested in
meaning.”95
Commentators disagree about whether protecting a suggestive mark
threatens language depletion or competitive harm, and these competing
assertions have little empirical support. For example, Landes and Posner
conclude that the number of available suggestive marks is “not much less” than
arbitrary or fanciful marks, noting that goods with suggestive marks like
BUSINESS WEEK and WALL STREET JOURNAL compete effectively with
goods with arbitrary marks like FORBES and BARRON’S.96 The ability of
marks to compete doesn’t speak to whether other competitors were blocked off
90 “Language exclusivity” is a term used by Stephen Carter. Carter, supra note 4, at
769. Landes and Posner instead call it “language monopoly.” Landes & Posner, supra note
87, at 292.
91 See, e.g., Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985).
92 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 288.
93 Carter, supra note 4, at 775 (“[T]he elasticity of supply of low-cost substitute marks
varies as a function of the distance of the mark from the generic.”).
94 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 290. Landes and Posner observe, however, that
if a descriptive term becomes a source signifier, granting protection “may create consumer
benefits, by reducing confusion and search costs by more than the costs to rivals of being
forbidden to use the same word.” Id. Lisa Ramsey argues instead that this shift occurs
precisely because the law protects rights in descriptive terms, and the shift would be unlikely
to occur without the legal right. Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1157–58 n.319 (2003).
95 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 289.
96 Id.
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because they couldn’t use a suggestive mark like WALL STREET JOURNAL
to sell their newspapers. Other scholars voice suspicion that there may be a
limited supply of suitable suggestive marks, or that commandeering a suggestive
mark might create the same competitive advantage one acquires from
controlling a descriptive mark. For example, Stephen Carter hypothesizes that
the problem of language depletion may manifest just as strongly for suggestive
marks as descriptive marks.97 Similarly, Terry Fisher notes that protection of
any mark can harm later entrants whether the protected name is informative or
attractive.98
The threat of language depletion is not universally accepted.99
Commentators have noted that the preference of many competitors is to select a
distinctive and distinguishable mark that is unlike a prior competitor’s mark.100
Scholars have also noted that there are a limited number of firms that can
effectively compete in a given market, reducing the number of alternative
trademarks that must be available in order to support a properly functioning
market.101
A more complete picture of the line between suggestive and descriptive
marks requires more than an analysis of competition concerns.102 In fact,
correctly calculating the danger of language depletion depends on the cost to
rivals of developing alternative means to denote the product sold.103 In addition,
97 Carter, supra note 4, at 793–94; cf. id. at 774. (“[T]he possibility of rent-seeking
through a costly language exclusivity is not limited to the case of a firm’s adoption of a
generic word, and the other cases in which rent-seeking might occur are somewhat more
difficult to deal with. The unhappy truth is that firms try consistently (often against their
attorneys’ advice) to find marks that, while perhaps not generic, are a long way from being
fanciful.”).
98 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 170 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (“[T]rademarks
can sometimes be socially harmful—for example, by enabling the first entrant into a market
to discourage competition by appropriating for itself an especially attractive or informative
brand name.”).
99 See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695,
702–03 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (noting that available words are abundant and “possible
varieties of advertising display and packaging are virtually endless”).
100 See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 90 TRADEMARK
REP. 823, 828 n.32 (2000).
101 Carter, supra note 4, at 788 (“[O]nly a limited number of marks will be removed
from the market language in any given product market, because there is not space for an
infinite number of firms.”).
102 McCarthy has suggested a laundry list of questions a court might ask to distinguish
suggestive from descriptive marks. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 11:21–:22, :66–:71 (cited
by Trustco Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Glens Falls Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 903 F. Supp. 335, 342
(N.D.N.Y. 1995)) (proposing courts consider 1) how much imagination is required to
connect the term to the product; 2) whether the mark says something about the product that
competitors would want to say about their similar competing products; 3) whether other
sellers use the term; 4) whether the mark conjures up a purely arbitrary connection; and 5)
whether buyers are likely to see the mark as a symbol of origin, or self-laudatory advertising).
103 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 292.
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questions of competitive harm turn on how a trademark communicates
information to consumers, and how efficiently the mark can make connections
between the source and the product offered for sale. It is not enough to ask how
many substitutes are left when a mark owner selects a mark. The law must also
consider which substitutes work as source signifiers or product identifiers and
why. The next Section summarizes how courts and commentators describe the
communicative effect of various trademarks along the Abercrombie spectrum.

2. Communicative Power and the Imaginary Line Between Descriptive
and Suggestive Marks
The federal courts of appeals have articulated several related but distinct
tests for distinguishing suggestive from descriptive marks. The majority of
circuits ask about the degree of imagination required to connect the trademark
to the product.104 As the Seventh Circuit states, “if the mark imparts information
directly, it is descriptive,” but “[i]f it stands for an idea which requires some
operation of the imagination to connect it with the goods, it is suggestive.”105
Applying a similar standard in Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Industries,
Inc.,106 the Second Circuit concluded that FORTIFLEX for plastic resin was
suggestive despite its descriptive element because it “[o]bviously . . . takes
imagination to conjure the image of plastic resin from the term
‘FORTIFLEX.’”107 In other cases, the inquiry turns on the directness or immediacy
of the connection between the product and the trademark.108 For instance, in In
104 See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 952 (7th Cir.

1992); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other
grounds by Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).
Some scholars criticize this imagination standard. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 31, at 1044
(“‘[I]magination’ and related inquiries introduce a theoretical sleight of hand: They begin
with the premise that trademark protectability turns on consumer perception of inherent
distinctiveness, but then formulate tests that instead evaluate the immediacy or degree of
inherent descriptiveness.”).
105 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976)
(quoting ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.06, at 77 (1963)).
106 Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1987).
107 Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Soltex
Polymer, 832 F.2d at 1328); see also Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib.
Co., 253 F.2d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 1958), cited with approval by Union Carbide, 531 F.2d at
379 (“Suggestive terms ‘suggest’, but do not describe the qualities of a particular product.
The distinction threatens to be one without a difference. Essentially, however, the common
and ordinary meaning of the term to the public and the incongruous use of it as it relates to
the product determine whether a term is suggestive.” (quoting the district court opinion,
Union Carbide, 392 F. Supp. 280, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1975))).
108 Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d
902, 911 (9th Cir. 1995) (defining the inquiry into imaginativeness as one concerning “how
immediate and direct is the thought process from the mark to the particular product. If the
mental leap between the word and the product’s attribute is not almost instantaneous, this
strongly indicates suggestiveness, not direct descriptiveness.” (citation omitted) (first
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re American Society of Clinical Pathologists, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that REGISTRY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGISTS was merely
descriptive because it would “immediately convey to one seeing or hearing it
the thought of appellant’s [board certification and examination services].”109
This inquiry into the imagination required of consumers versus directness
of connection between the product and the mark has been subdivided into tests
about whether the mark describes “the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics
of the goods”;110 “conveys information regarding a function, or purpose, or use
of the goods”;111 describes “a feature or part of the goods”;112 or “conveys
information about any properties of the goods.”113 For many courts, the
perception of communicative effectiveness turns on the immediacy of the
connection between mark and product.
The suggestive–descriptive line also ostensibly turns on consumer
perspective.114 A descriptive term “conveys to one who is unfamiliar with the
product its functions or qualities.”115 Unfortunately, because evidence of
secondary meaning is required only for descriptive marks, a court often
quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 349; and then quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11.21[1],
at 11-108 to -109)); In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“[A
descriptive mark] forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or
characteristics of the goods.” (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976))); Perfect Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d
519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The defining feature of a descriptive mark is that it gives the
consumer an immediate idea of the contents of the product.”).
109 In re Am. Soc’y of Clinical Pathologists, Inc., 442 F.2d 1404, 1407 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
110 See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 528 (1924) (“A
name which is merely descriptive of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of an article
of trade cannot be appropriated as a trademark . . . .”); Andrew J. McPartland, Inc. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 164 F.2d 603, 608 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (“[T]he law w[ill] not secure
to any person the exclusive use of a trade-mark consisting merely of words descriptive of the
qualities, ingredients, or characteristics of an article of trade . . . .” (quoting Estate of P.D.
Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920))).
111 In re Abcor, 588 F.2d at 813; see also, e.g., In re Reynolds Metals Co., 480 F.2d 902,
903–04 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (stating that although “merely descriptive” marks are unregistrable,
marks “suggestive of one purpose to which the goods may be put . . . are registrable”).
112 See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 733 (3d
Cir. 1957) (“Here we have an effort to register an alleged trade-mark, consisting of
something which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire, and not
registerable at all, and is descriptive of the particular type of tire . . . .” (quoting Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.3d 833, 844 (4th Cir. 1928))).
113 See, e.g., JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.03, at 2-31
(1988) (“[A term] is descriptive if it informs the purchasing public of the characteristics,
quality, functions, uses, ingredients, components, or other properties of a product, or conveys
comparable information about a service.”).
114 Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The [Lanham]
Act is aimed to protect purchasers in the marketplace, and it is their perception that
determines whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive.” (citing Thompson Medical Co. v.
Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985))).
115 In re D.C. Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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evaluates likely consumer perception without key evidence of how consumers
see the mark,116 relying instead on how it thinks consumers will perceive the
mark.117
Due to the close conceptual relationship between a descriptive mark and the
product with which it is associated, some scholars argue that selecting a
descriptive term as a mark allows the mark owner to “free ride” on associations
between the mark and the product sold.118 On the other hand, suggestive marks
are treated as though they do not pose any danger of free riding because the
connection between mark and product is insufficiently direct.119 In fact, courts
sometimes conclude that if the mark is suggestive, it is the second entrant that
engages in problematic free riding which the law should discourage.120
Courts err in substituting the directness of the connection between the mark
and the product for the effectiveness of the mark as a communicator. To the
contrary, recent research indicates that some arbitrary or fanciful marks can be
equally effective vessels for a number of different products. For example, when
professional product namers like Catchword or Interbrand generate a list of
names for a client, the client eventually chooses one, but many of the remaining
names are catalogued and reused when the next client needs a name. These
professional namers operate as if there exists a “Platonic ideal of good names,
independent of products good or bad—a name so good that it could work, if not
on anything, than at least on many things.”121 This is so in part because recent
studies suggest morphemes and phonemes, the building blocks of words, convey
meaning even before those building blocks are combined into a word.122
116 Cf. supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the 5-HOUR ENERGY case).
117 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 301 (3d Cir. 1986).
118 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 94, at 1155 (“[W]hen a descriptive term is first used as

a mark, that mark is not yet distinctive, but it is valuable instantly—before any advertising
or sales—because the term is attribute-identifying and provides information about the
qualities and characteristics of the product. A business that selects and uses a descriptive
term as a mark on its product is, in effect, free-riding off the attribute-identifying value of
the descriptive term.” (footnote omitted)); see also Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc.,
772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985).
119 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield, 808 F.2d at 297 (stating that suggestive marks convey indirect
or vague information about the product or service).
120 See, e.g., Scandia Down, 772 F.3d at 1430.
121 Neal Gabler, The Weird Science of Naming New Products, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/magazine/the-weird-science-ofnaming-new-products.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4KJZ-BCRD] (reporting on interviews
with professional namers at Catchword and Interbrand).
122 Multiple studies conducted by linguist Will Leben report that survey participants
perceive some made-up words as fast, small, and light versus slow, big, and heavy depending
on the vowels and consonants comprising the word and the order in which they are used. Id.
For example, research participants report that “fip” sounds faster than “fop” because the
word “fip” has less acoustic substance or weight than fop. Likewise, the “S” of Swiffer, a
mark for mops with a disposable head, sounds fast and easy, while the “D” of Dasani, a mark
for bottled water sounds heavier, and thus relaxing rather than refreshing. Id. See generally
Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful? (Dec. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
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In analyzing trademark law, courts should consider how consumers process
the information communicated by the trademark. The Abercrombie spectrum
posits that the connection between the word chosen and the product offered
channels trademark meaning. We can gain insight into whether that is so by
examining how language changes, how change is processed and how new
meanings are added to the lexicon. An understanding of these phenomena can
help us evaluate how consumers are likely to react when a firm tries to add new
source signifying meaning to an existing word. This information may then lead
us to reconsider the treatment of various categories of trademarks along the
Abercrombie spectrum.
This Article is not the first to question the Abercrombie spectrum, or
whether courts should apply it. Standard critiques of the Abercrombie spectrum
as it applies to word marks follow two primary lines of attack.123 Some scholars
argue that the spectrum lacks empirical support.124 Other scholars suggest that
focusing on the spectrum and on inherent or conceptual strength may distract
courts from considering more important factors, like acquired or commercial
strength.125
The existing literature provides insight into how and why a mark acquires
source significance in context, but discounts the importance of the initial mark
file with author) [hereinafter Linford, Fanciful?] (reporting on psychological, linguistic, and
marketing research that shows sounds chosen to comprise a fanciful mark convey
information that consumers may not recognize on a conscious level, but that nevertheless
shapes consumer perception of the product associated with the mark).
123 Courts and commentators primarily question the application of Abercrombie to nonword marks like trade dress, which includes both product packaging and product features,
and color used as a source signifier. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Inherent Distinctiveness, supra
note 12, at 568 (arguing that the Abercrombie spectrum “provide[s] a useless veneer to
intuitive judgments of protectability” in trade dress cases).
124 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1635–36 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, Empirical Study]
(arguing that commercial strength in the marketplace developed over time correlates with
mark owner victory in trademark litigation more than inherent or conceptual strength); Kevin
Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s
Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, 25 (confirming results of the Beebe study with a different data set); Lee et al., supra
note 31, at 1078, 1089, 1091–92 (arguing, based on consumer studies, that “contextual
markers” on trademark packaging are more important than the conceptual relationship of the
word chosen as a mark to the product); Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images
in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 871–74 (2011) (criticizing
continued reliance on the Abercrombie spectrum on the ground that it was offered by judges
decades before the start of empirical trademark and marketing research, and that it may be a
poor proxy for how readily consumers will recognize a given mark as an indication of
source).
125 Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 738–43 (2004)
(arguing that trademark law should focus on the context of trademark usage over categorical
determinations); Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark
Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 535, 582 (2013) (arguing as a normative matter that
commercial strength should trump inherent strength in trademark inquiries).
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selection. These critiques are not fully satisfying because they tilt too far toward
marketplace context and commercial strength, failing to fully recognize how
initial consumer perception of the connection between different meanings of a
word can shape how the meanings are accessed, processed, and understood. It
is true that commercial strength can and should trump conceptual strength when
there is evidence of the former,126 but that does not mean courts should overlook
inherent strength as a relevant starting point.127 In fact, generalizable baselines
about how consumers perceive trademarks can aid courts in reaching the
ultimate question of whether a mark has acquired commercial strength.
Research on the interaction between conceptual and commercial strength is
mixed. For instance, studies by Barton Beebe and Kevin Blum et al. identify
some cases where developed commercial strength correlated with the outcome
of trademark litigation but inherent strength did not.128 But such a finding does
not belie the importance of inherent strength as a starting point, particularly in
light of evidence from the Beebe and Blum studies that conceptual and
commercial strength dovetail in many cases,129 and that conceptual strength
frequently correlates with the ultimate outcome of litigation.130
A different type of critique, closer in spirit to the proposal in this Article,
argues that the law should focus on how consumers process a mark. Lisa
Ouellette suggests that the best way to understand how consumers perceive a
mark is by looking to crowdsourced evidence of consumer perception like
search engine results.131 Ouellette’s proposal considers how to track changes in
trademark meaning over time. Irina Manta instead recommends observing the
subconscious or automatic reactions of survey respondents, which she argues
are more likely to mirror the snap buying decisions of consumers than direct
survey responses.132 Manta touches on a critical issue that this Article explores
in more depth: Part III of this Article turns to research into language change to
126 See, e.g., Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 52, at 727–28. But see Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992) (rejecting invitation to hold that
inherently distinctive trade dress that failed to acquire distinctiveness should be subject to
forfeiture or defeasance).
127 Cf. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 125, at 537–38 (noting that courts made the
“correct[] shift towards a focus on actual market strength” over inherent strength, but the
shift “has resulted . . . in a relatively unbounded free-for-all in which beleaguered judges are
asked to examine any evidence that might be probative of acquired strength” (emphasis
omitted)).
128 Blum et al., supra note 124, at 27.
129 Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 124, at 1638.
130 Id. at 1637–39; Blum et al., supra note 124, at 26 (reporting that arbitrary marks were
positively correlated with an ultimate finding of likelihood of confusion, while descriptive
marks were negatively correlated with an ultimate finding of likelihood of confusion).
131 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 351, 362 (2014).
132 Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural
Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1036
(2007).
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explain how the connection between the mark and the product sold can channel
consumer processing, and set a baseline for the acquisition of source
significance.

III. SEMANTIC SHIFT: HOW EXISTING WORDS ADD NEW MEANINGS
This Part provides an overview of the etymological, theoretical, and
cognitive literatures on language change necessary to understand how trademark
acquisition is a form of semantic shift.133 Most word marks are created by
adding new, source-signifying meaning to a pre-existing word, like APPLE for
a brand of computers, GLEEM for a brand of toothpaste, or SEALTIGHT for a
brand of fasteners. Like the creation of trademark meaning, semantic shift is
driven and motivated by the need to communicate. And like other semantic shift
events, the creation of trademark meaning introduces ambiguity as new
meanings are added to existing words. The effectiveness of the attempted
communication, and the ease of processing the ambiguity, depends largely on
the nature of the relationship between a new word or meaning and the older
word from which it is derived.
This Part then explains how recent cognitive experiments support the
etymological account with regard to how a listener or reader makes sense of a
given use of a word with multiple meanings.134 These studies measure
participant response times in word recognition tasks, and report that exposure
to one meaning of a word increases the speed with which a listener or reader can
access other related, or polysemous, meanings. These same studies indicate that
exposure to a homonymous, or unrelated meaning, confers no processing
advantage. The cognitive evidence bolsters theoretical and etymological
accounts of language change and supports the division of new meanings into
established linguistic classifications.
If trademark law proposes to protect marks so they can (and to the extent
that they) effectively convey information to consumers,135 the law must take
133 See infra Part IV.A; see also Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 131–
40. This summary also informs the prescriptions for reforming trademark law in Part IV.B–
C, infra.
134 See generally Ekaterini Klepousniotou & Shari R. Baum, Disambiguating the
Ambiguity Advantage Effect in Word Recognition: An Advantage for Polysemous but Not
Homonymous Words, 20 J. NEUROLINGUISTICS 1 (2007); Ekaterini Klepousniotou, The
Processing of Lexical Ambiguity: Homonymy and Polysemy in the Mental Lexicon, 81 BRAIN
& LANGUAGE 205 (2002) [hereinafter Klepousniotou, Processing]; Klepousniotou,
Reconciling, supra note 26.
135 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2116 (2004) (“The three main policy reasons for protecting marks—reducing
consumer search costs, maintaining and improving product quality, and remedying
intentional deception—all relate to the quality of the product information available to
consumers.”); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006) [hereinafter Bone, Hunting Goodwill]
(“The core of trademark law . . . is based on a[n] . . . ‘information transmission model.’ This
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consumer perception into account.136 Like any other change in language,
investing a term with source significance requires the new meaning to reach a
critical mass of popular acceptance. Generalizable rules about language change
may provide insight into how the connection between the trademark and the
product facilitate communication and make the mark more appealing. These
rules may thus also provide important insight into how to better reshape
trademark law to meet its information transmission objective.

A. Motivations for Semantic Shift: Updating Language and Managing
Ambiguity
Language fluctuates constantly. New words are continually added to the
lexicon as existing words gain new meanings. Twin motivations drive this
semantic shift—enabling linguistic innovation and managing ambiguity.137 For
instance, a speaker might add a new meaning to an existing word to give voice
to a new concept,138 or to better describe objective changes in the world that
require “a new name in a concrete situation.”139 When new meanings are added
to existing words, the audience must discern which of a word’s multiple
meanings is intended by the speaker. Different meanings of a single word can
create what scholars call homonymic tension or semantic overload.140 But
languages develop tools for dealing with this ambiguity,141 evolving “curative
devices . . . to resolve ‘intolerable’ conflicts.”142
The need to manage ambiguity also shapes semantic shift. Dirk Geeraerts
postulates two rival principles of language efficiency: formal efficiency and
conceptual efficiency. Formal efficiency seeks to optimize the directness of the
relationship between a word and the thing it signifies, following a few simple
model views trademarks as devices for communicating information to the market and sees
the goal of trademark law as preventing others from using similar marks to deceive or
confuse consumers.”).
136 See Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 117–19.
137 See Dirk Geeraerts, Reclassifying Semantic Change, 4 QUADERNI DI SEMANTICA 217,
226, 234 (1983) [hereinafter Geeraerts, Reclassifying].
138 Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of the
Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, in HISTORICAL SEMANTICS AND COGNITION 61,
82–83 (Andreas Blank & Peter Koch eds., 1999) [hereinafter Blank, New Meanings]; cf.
TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that speaker-driven language change is a
phenomenon that cuts across languages).
139 Blank, New Meanings, supra note 138, at 62 (describing the decision of the inventor
of a self-propelled underwater munition to name it torpedo, after a species of stingray); see
also Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 131–34.
140 STEPHEN ULLMANN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTICS 132 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter
ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES] (quoting LEONARD ROBERT PALMER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MODERN LINGUISTICS 113 (1936)); Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 226, 234.
This tension can arise over polysemous senses as well as homonymous meanings.
141 ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 140, at 132.
142 Id. at 134.
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rules. First, language will shorten phrases, like periodical paper to
periodical,143 to economize expression.144 Second, confusing ambiguity is often
resolved by shifting toward monosemy, i.e., one meaning for one word.145 In a
lexicon that maximizes formal efficiency, ambiguity would be kept to a
minimum, which can make communication easier. However, that clarity would
come at its own cost: communicating a new concept would always require the
creation of a unique word.
Unlike formal efficiency, conceptual efficiency optimizes existing
connections between related things. Using the same word to signify two or more
unrelated concepts tends to confuse readers and listeners, even if context can
subsequently clear up initial confusion. Diachronic research into language
change over time indicates that listeners more easily comprehend new and
ambiguous words when those words relate to existing meanings.146 For
example, in Gallic French, two Latin terms for “rooster” and “cat” merged into
one word, gat, that carried both meanings.147 To resolve that ambiguity, gat for
“rooster” was abandoned, and two new words for ‘rooster’ were adopted. The
first new word for rooster added a new meaning to an existing word: bigey, a
word for “parish curate,” took on “rooster” as an additional meaning.148
Geeraerts argues this addition is conceptually or metaphorically efficient
because both the curate of a parish and the rooster in the chicken coop are
overseers of a given domain.149
Similarly, the word faisan for “pheasant” was modulated slightly to create
a new word, azan for “rooster.”150 This new word was more conceptually
efficient than a word plucked out of the air, because pheasants and roosters are
birds with a similar appearance. The conceptual relationship makes it easier to
overcome the confusion that can occur when one word has multiple meanings.
In essence, Geeraerts argues that conceptual efficiency results in less
semantic overload and is easier to process, even when formal inefficiency
persists. In other words, it is easier to reach the intended meaning, rooster, when
you start at pheasant or curate than when you start at cat.151 The audience can
tolerate formal inefficiency when new meaning is added to an existing word,
because the audience can use conceptual efficiency as an interpretive tool.
As the Article explains in more detail in Part IV, most trademarks are
created by adding new meaning to existing words, or fragments of words, rather
143 DIRK GEERAERTS, THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 39 (2010) [hereinafter
GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS].
144 Robert J. Menner, The Conflict of Homonyms in English, 12 LANGUAGE 229, 237
(1936).
145 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 227; see also infra Part IV.B–C.
146 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 225.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 225.
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than invented from scratch.152 Those additions arguably reduce formal
efficiency. But the connections between old and new meanings will allow the
mark to trade on conceptual efficiency.

B. Regularity in Semantic Shift: Distinguishing Polysemy from
Homonymy
The previous Section explained that semantic shift occurs when a speaker
needs to say something new, and often happens in a manner that reduces
confusing ambiguity. This Section describes how semantic shift occurs in
predictable patterns across languages.153 Those patterns can shape the
acquisition of trademark meaning, which at its base is a form of semantic shift.
The following table summarizes several regular forms of semantic shift, and
whether the shift is formally or conceptually efficient.154
Table 3: Regular Semantic Shift and Formal v. Conceptual Efficiency
Semantic Innovation / Linguistic
Relationship
Monoseme:
Only one meaning
Homonym:
No connection between existing
meanings and the new meaning
Metaphor:
Figurative connection between existing
meanings and the new sense
Metonym:
Literal or contiguous connection between
existing and new sense, like feature for
the whole
Ex.: Green Beret from distinctive
headgear worn by U.S. Army Special
Forces shifts to serve as a nickname for
the organization and its members

Formal
Efficiency
High

Conceptual
Efficiency
Low (New word,
no relationship)

Low

Low

Low

High

Low

High

152 See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 472

n.97 (2009) (comparing the originality required to create a fanciful, coined mark to the
appropriation of pre-existing words that characterizes the creation of arbitrary, suggestive,
or descriptive marks).
153 TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, at 3.
154 See also supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
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Some new entries into the lexicon are brand new words. When coined, these
monosemes have a singular meaning.155 The term monoseme came into
common usage to describe technical medical terms at the turn of the 20th
century, but has since been applied to certain prominent brands. For example,
David Crystal points to Microsoft as an example of a monosemous term.156 Any
new word made up whole cloth will be a monoseme, at least at first.
New meanings are added to existing words in two primary ways: polysemy
and homonymy. Polysemy describes the addition of a new meaning that is
etymologically related to the existing meaning of a word.157 Linguists posit that
polysemes are interrelated in such a way that the reader or listener generates
multiple meanings from a single, central, sense.158 For example, a bank is
simultaneously a financial institution, the building in which the financial
institution is housed, any number of institutions that store things (like a blood
bank), and a synonym for “rely upon,” i.e., “You can bank on it.”159 All those
meanings were derived from the Italian term for bench, which was “extended in
Italian to [also mean] ‘tradesman’s stall, counter, [or] money changer’s
table.’”160
Polysemous shifts regularly occur in two ways: metaphoric and
metonymic.161 Metaphoric shifts are based on a specific analogous similarity
between different concepts.162 For instance, broadcast originally meant
scattering seed “abroad over the whole surface, instead of . . . sow[ing] in drills
or rows”;163 later came to mean scattering some thing widely abroad;164 and was
eventually used to refer to the process of disseminating a radio or television
signal.165 Crane, a bird with a long neck and legs, was likewise extended
155 DAVID CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS 191 (2006) (pointing to “Microsoft” as

an example of a monosemous term); see also Mononym, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/238541 [http://perma.cc/Y92LSLLS] (“Chiefly Med. Obs.,
A technical name consisting of one word only.”). Monosemy is a circumstance where words
or phrases have a single meaning, or where there is an absence of ambiguity. See generally
CHARLES RUHL, ON MONOSEMY: A STUDY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (1989).
156 CRYSTAL, supra note 155, at 191. While polysemes and homonyms are shared
meanings for the same word, a monoseme stands apart from other lexemes.
157 Allan defines polysemy as “the property of an expression with more than one
meaning.” 1 KEITH ALLAN, LINGUISTIC MEANING § 3.3.1 (1986).
158 Klepousniotou & Baum, supra note 134, at 4 (positing that polysemes have a single
core meaning from which interrelated senses are derived, while homonyms have mutually
exclusive meanings, one of which must be selected before further processing can occur).
159 WILLIAM CROFT & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 109–10 (2004).
160 Bank, n.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15237
[http://perma.cc/AT85-8UTE].
161 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 27.
162 GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 143, at 26–27.
163 Broadcast, adj., adv., and n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/23507 [http://perma.cc/5HUY-JXPE].
164 Id.
165 Id.
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metaphorically to a machine with a projecting arm used to raise and lower heavy
weight.166
A metonymic shift is instead a change based on contiguity or connection
between concepts or an understood association.167 For instance, the word horn
as it referred to “horn of an animal” was eventually used to describe a “wind
instrument.” The shift was conceptually efficient because the use of animal
horns as musical instruments made the new meaning of horn as a word for a
musical instrument easier to process and remember.168
Another standard metonymic shift is a part–whole substitution, where “the
meaning of the whole is transferred to a word that originally designated only a
part of the whole.”169 This shift often happens in political reporting, where the
British Government is referred to collectively by the address of the Prime
Minister’s residence, Number 10 (as in Downing Street),170 and the U.S.
government is identified collectively as Washington.171 In other cases, a
distinguishing feature is used to represent the whole, like Green Beret for the
military unit famous for wearing the distinctive headgear.172
Metaphoric and metonymic shifts are not formally efficient, because they
violate the tendency toward monosemy, i.e., one meaning for each word.173
They are nevertheless conceptually efficient, because the new meanings are
cognitively related to existing meanings.174 For the listener, every addition of a
new term introduces potentially confusing ambiguity,175 but when the new term
is related to other terms familiar to the hearer, the ambiguity can be more readily
resolved.176 As Geeraerts explained, adding new meanings that are related to
existing meanings is generally preferred to the alternative.177 For the speaker,
these polysemous shifts provide flexibility to communicate in new
166 Crane, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/43797

[http://perma.cc/CLK8-BEMS].
167 TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, at 28; see also Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Process
and Products in Making Sense of Tropes, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 252, 258–59 (Andrew
Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (“[M]etonymy expresses simple contiguous relations between
objects, such as part-whole, cause-effect, and so on.”).
168 Andreas Blank, Co-Presence and Succession: A Cognitive Typology of Metonymy,
in METONYMY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 169, 182 (Klaus-Uwe Panther & Günter Radden
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Blank, Co-Presence].
169 D. GARY MILLER, ENGLISH LEXICOGENESIS 110 (2014). Some scholars distinguish
between metonymy and synecdoche. Id.
170 Willem B. Hollmann, Semantic Change, in ENGLISH LANGUAGE: DESCRIPTION,
VARIATION AND CONTEXT 301, 305 (Jonathan Culpeper et al. eds., 2009).
171 M. JIMMIE KILLINGSWORTH, APPEALS IN MODERN RHETORIC: AN ORDINARYLANGUAGE APPROACH 130 (2005).
172 MILLER, supra note 169, at 111.
173 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
174 See Geerarerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 234.
175 Id. at 225.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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circumstances.178 Returning to the example of rooster, discussed above,179 the
connection between rooster and pheasant is metonymic—the two birds share a
body type and common features. The connection between rooster and curate is
metaphoric. A rooster acts in his henhouse domain as a curate acts in his parish.
Both shifts were conceptually efficient, and thus preferable over rooster and cat
sharing the word gat.
Unlike metonyms and metaphors, homonyms are unrelated meanings for the
same word, and both cognitively and formally inefficient.180 Homonyms look
or sound the same,181 but are usually etymologically distinct and come from
different roots. For example, while the word “bank” can be used to describe a
financial institution or the land at the edge of a river or stream,182 those
meanings are homonymous, stemming from independent and unrelated sources.
As discussed in Part III.C, infra, recent cognitive experiments indicate that
homonymous meanings operate as distinct concepts in the minds of the audience
interpreting ambiguity, while polysemous meanings are stored as interrelated
senses and are thus more easily processed and accessed. Thus, for a word with
homonymous meanings, it is difficult, but not impossible, to simultaneously
construe a given use of the word under both meanings.183
Finally, while both polysemy and homonymy are formally inefficient
because they result in ambiguity, Dirk Geeraerts argues that polysemous
ambiguity “is based on a conceptually efficient metaphorical process.”184 As a
result, a shift that adds polysemous ambiguity may be well received by the
audience despite increasing formal inefficiency. There is thus some tendency
for language to shift away from homonymous ambiguity toward polysemous
ambiguity. As the next Section discusses, the relative ease of comprehending
polysemous ambiguity compared to homonymous ambiguity is supported not
only by diachronic accounts of language change over time, but also by recent
cognitive research.

178 Dirk Geeraerts, Diachronic Prototype Semantics. A Digest, in HISTORICAL
SEMANTICS AND COGNITION, supra note 138, at 91, 101–03.
179 See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
180 Linguists sometimes differentiate between homonymous meanings (in effect, a new
word sharing a similar form or sound) and polysemous senses (a new sense or variation on
an existing meaning of a particular word). Technically, it is more accurate to say that
homonyms are different words with the same lexeme—a collection of letters and sounds that
comprise an identifiable unit. Each homonymous word is a separate lexical entry.
181 For the sake of simplicity, I include within homonymy both homophones (lexemes
that sound the same but have different written forms and different meanings) and
homographs (lexemes with the same written form but different pronunciations and
meanings). See generally Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134.
182 Bank, supra note 160.
183 CROFT & CRUSE, supra note 159, at 112.
184 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 225.
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C. Cognitive Research: Processing Ambiguous Words
The etymological and theoretical accounts of semantic shift discussed in
Parts III.A & B are supported by recent cognitive research that has detected
statistically significant differences in the way listeners and readers access and
process ambiguity across different categories of words. This experimental
evidence suggests that listeners and readers who are confronted with ambiguous
words rely on distinct processing mechanisms to access polysemous senses and
homonymous meanings.185 In other words, studies have identified significant
differences in cognitive processing between homonymy and polysemy.186
While exposure to a polysemous meaning helps the audience access or recall
other polysemous meanings, exposure to a homonymous meaning provides no
aid in accessing other homonymous meanings. The following table summarizes
those findings.
Table 4: Cognitive Processing Advantage Conferred by Different Types of
Ambiguous Words
Linguistic
Relationship
Metonymic
Polysemy
Metaphoric
Polysemy
Homonymy

Measured Processing Advantage
Processing advantage over metaphoric polysemy,
homonymy, and control words in all lexical tasks
Processing advantage over homonymy and control
words in some lexical tasks
No processing advantage over control words in any
lexical task

Early research into cognitive language processing posited that exposure to
one meaning of a word with multiple meanings would aid in recognition of those
other meanings. Several recent psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies by
Ekaterini Klepousniotou and others report that it is not the existence of multiple
meanings but the relationship between the meanings that affects audience
recognition.187 In these studies, respondents completed lexical tasks more
185 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 42.
186 Id. at 25 (citing studies by Tamiko Azuma & Guy C. Van Orden, Why SAFE is Better

Than FAST: The Relatedness of a Word’s Meanings Affects Lexical Decision Times, 36 J.
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 484 (1997); Lyn Frazier & Keith Rayner, Taking on Semantic
Commitments: Processing Multiple Meanings vs. Multiple Senses, 29 J. MEMORY &
LANGUAGE 181 (1990); Steven Frisson & Martin J. Pickering, The Processing of Metonymy:
Evidence from Eye Movements, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1366 (1999); Jennifer Rodd
et al., Making Sense of Semantic Ambiguity: Semantic Competition in Lexical Access, 46 J.
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 245 (2002); John N. Williams, Processing Polysemous Words in
Context: Evidence for Interrelated Meanings, 21 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 193 (1992)).
187 See generally Klepousniotou & Baum, supra note 134; Klepousniotou, Reconciling,
supra note 26.
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quickly when presented with polysemous words—i.e., words having multiple
related senses. Both metonymic and metaphoric polysemes conferred
statistically significant processing advantages over control words in laboratory
settings.188 While both types of polysemes provided processing advantages
compared to control words, metonyic polysemes conferred processing
advantages more consistently across multiple experiments than metaphoric
polysemes. In addition, metonymic polysemes conferred a statistically
significant processing advantage compared with metaphoric polysemes.
Metonymic polysemes also conferred a statistically significant processing
advantage over homonyms. Metaphoric polysemes conferred a statistically
significant advantage compared to homonyms in some studies. In other studies,
the advantage conferred over homonyms was measurable but not statistically
significant. Unlike metaphoric and metonymic polysemes, homonyms provided
no processing advantage over control words across multiple studies.189 A
different series of experiments conducted by Devorah Klein and Gregory
Murphy also observed a significant difference in the processing of polysemous
words as opposed to homonymous words, although they described both effects
as minor.190
The studies by Klepousniotou and Klein & Murphy suggest that for
polysemes, the existence of multiple related senses of a word makes it easier to
access the word in the reader’s mental lexicon.191 When there are several
apparently identical words with polysemous or related meanings, they are
mentally stored in a way that facilitates processing and recognizing the word.
However, these studies also indicate that homonymous meanings convey no
such processing advantage. Klepousniotou concludes from this evidence that
homonymous words have multiple meanings with distinct representations in the
mental lexicon.192 Homonymous words are thus stored as different entries and
188 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 29. While the result was not
statistically significant, in one study homonymous words were processed more slowly than
the control words. Id.
189 Id.
190 Devorah E. Klein & Gregory L. Murphy, Paper Has Been My Ruin: Conceptual
Relations of Polysemous Senses, 47 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 548, 551 (2002); see also id.
at 556–57 (finding, in categorization tasks, “an advantage for the polysemous words over the
homonyms, and thus that the polysemous items share more connections than just a repeated
word. The polysemous senses have more conceptual coherence than the different homonym
meanings do.”); id. at 563–64 (finding, in induction tasks, that “polysemous items had
stronger induction than homonyms” and that “[t]he closer two senses were, the stronger the
induction from one to the other”). But see Devorah E. Klein & Gregory L. Murphy, The
Representation of Polysemous Words, 45 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 259, 259 (2001) (finding,
contrary to theory of semantically shared polysemous senses, that using a word in one sense
provided no processing advantage for using it in a difference sense, but instead slowed down
the second use, relative to a control condition).
191 See also Rodd et al., supra note 186, at 245 (finding a significant ambiguity
advantage in lexical decision tasks for polysemous words with multiple related senses, and
a delay for homonymous words with multiple unrelated meanings).
192 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 29, 42.
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accessed separately in the mental lexicon.193 As a result, the speed with which
the word is accessed may be reduced because multiple conflicting meanings are
competing for activation in the reader’s mind.194 On the other hand, the
difference in processing speed suggests that polysemes have a single
representation with various senses and that, for the listener or reader, there is
little or no semantic overload that might compromise the activation process.195
At first glance, metaphors may appear to occupy a middle ground between
metonymic polysemy and homonymy, supporting earlier theories that lexical
ambiguity occurs on a spectrum.196 However, the similarities between metaphor
and metonym are greater than their differences, and are certainly greater than
similarities between metaphor and homonym.
Like the cognitive research summarized above, marketing research often
measures the speed of survey completion as a way to gauge implicit,
subconscious, or unconscious responses. Processing speed can provide a clearer
picture of how marks communicate and why marks are more effective than
consumer responses to direct questions. As in other contexts, instantaneous or
subconscious processing is often more powerful, and certainly more automatic,
than deliberate decision-making mechanisms.197
It can nevertheless be problematic to extrapolate consumer habits from
processing delays in laboratory experiments.198 Some scholars have questioned
what response time might actually tell us about consumer decisions because it
is difficult, if not impossible, to “know at what point a response delay becomes
enough to change a purchase decision.”199 Thus, a delay in response time might
not be “enough to justify realigning [trademark] doctrine.”200

193 Id.
194 Id. at 29.
195 Id.; see also supra notes 157–60, 191, and accompanying text.
196 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Jurij D. Apresjan, Regular

Polysemy, 142 LINGUISTICS 5 (1974)).
197 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006) (“The very existence of implicit bias poses a
challenge to legal theory and practice, because discrimination doctrine is premised on the
assumption that, barring insanity or mental incompetence, human actors are guided by their
avowed (explicit) beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.”); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency
and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2041 (2011) (discussing how to deal
with implicit bias in policing and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Mark Spottswood,
Bridging the Gap Between Bayesian and Story-Comparison Models of Juridical Inference,
13 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 47, 54–56 (2014) (describing the effect of System 1
unconscious processing on decision making).
198 Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 527–28 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Gone]. But see Chris
Pullig et al., Brand Dilution: When Do New Brands Hurt Existing Brands?, 70 J. MARKETING
52, 63–64 (2006) (finding statistically significant effects on brand consideration and choice
from exposure to dilutive ads even after a five-day delay).
199 Tushnet, Gone, supra note 198, at 528.
200 Id. at 564.
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But this critique may be misguided because the speed of the first response
is often conversely related to the ease of subsequently changing the respondent’s
perspective. An instantaneous response, often referred to as System I
processing, can be difficult to dispel even when a person is presented with new
information that calls the first impression into question. Indeed, when faced with
evidence that contradicts a quick initial impression, many individuals will
double down on that initial impression.201 In fact, careful deliberation can
actually reinforce the first impulse rather than correct it. Thus, subconscious or
unconscious responses should not be discounted as easy to correct simply
because they occur quickly. If the initial instantaneous connection between the
word and the mark excavates a processing channel, it may be relatively difficult
to close off the channel or redirect information flowing through it. Thus,
assuming that the effect of unconscious processing will be short-lived may be
mistaken.
In addition, an implicit response may better predict future behavior than an
explicit response for three main reasons.202 First, the implicit approach may
uncover attitudes that consumers themselves have not recognized.203 Second,
implicit measurements can better reveal the factors driving social behavior than
explicit measurements.204 Finally, implicit measurements can better predict
actual product selection than self-reported measures.205
Turning to semantic shift literature for insights into trademark doctrine also
provides an opportunity to address a related concern raised by Rebecca Tushnet:
survey evidence is often viewed with skepticism because it can be distorted to
favor the party paying for the survey.206 To date, the semantic shift literature
has not been infected with marketing or litigant money, and the aforementioned
studies look to establish rules applicable across time and across languages. An
understanding of how language changes over time, and how the relationship of
words can affect processing speed, may help the law see beyond specific survey
evidence generated for litigation by providing generalizable rules about
language change that can be applied in the trademark context. The next Part
applies semantic shift research to trademark law, and explains how a suggestive
mark, like a descriptive mark, trades on the relationship between existing
product-related and new source-signifying meanings.

201 See Spottswood, supra note 197, at 54–56; cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand
Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 740 (2012) (arguing against a
multifactor test to correct perceived problems in the scope of the derivative work right
because “[w]e are very bad at understanding our own reactions. The reasons we give for our
decisions tend to be wrong or easily manipulable without our awareness.”).
202 GERALD ZALTMAN, HOW CUSTOMERS THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF
THE MARKET 115–16 (2003); cf. Manta, supra note 132, at 1036.
203 ZALTMAN, supra note 202, at 115.
204 Id. at 115.
205 Id. at 116. Zaltman is also an advocate of neuroimaging. Id. at 117.
206 See Tushnet, Gone, supra note 198, at 568.
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IV. SUGGESTIVE TRADEMARKS ARE NOT INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE
This Part marshals semantic shift literature to provide a limited defense for
the Abercrombie spectrum, and more importantly, to highlight a critical flaw
therein—treating a suggestive mark as inherently distinctive. As I describe
below, the relationship between either a suggestive or a descriptive mark and
the product sold is polysemous. Selecting a descriptive mark, which is
metonymically related to the product identified, or a suggestive mark, which is
metaphorically related to the product, connects the mark to the product in a
manner that will readily allow consumers to slip between source-signifying and
product-designating meanings. As a result, it is unlikely that either the
descriptive or suggestive mark inherently functions as a source signifier. In
addition, those polysemous connections may allow the mark owner to benefit
from processing advantages not conveyed by arbitrary marks, which are
unrelated (or homonymous in relation) to the good or service designated.
Trademark law aims to protect a mark so that it can convey accurate
information to consumers and extend its strongest protection to those marks that
most clearly indicate source. If the law is to properly distinguish “inherently
distinctive” marks from those that send mixed signals to consumers or evoke
qualities of the product sold, then protection should not automatically extend to
a suggestive mark on its first use in commerce. This Part concludes with
proposals for reforming trademark law in accordance with this insight.

A. Linguistics and Trademark Communication
This Article argues that trademark acquisition is like any other form of
semantic shift—a process by which new meaning is added to the lexicon.
Research into semantic shift teaches that like the creation of trademarks,
language change generally is driven by the need to find a new name or express
a new idea. Those changes can create confusing ambiguity.207 Semantic shift
typically follows paths that reduce confusing ambiguity. For example, language
tends to shift by adding related or polysemous meanings to existing words
because the connection between meanings helps the reader or listener recognize
and understand the new meaning. As trademark acquisition is a form of semantic
shift, linguistic theory and cognitive research may provide insight into how
trademark law can better reflect consumer perception and thus economize
consumer search and reduce consumer confusion.
The Abercrombie spectrum is challenged for a litany of reasons, including
failing to accurately reflect the best evidence of consumer perception and
207 STEPHEN ULLMANN, SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF MEANING

209–10 (1962) (“Whenever a new name is required to denote a new object or idea, we can
do one of three things: form a new word from existing elements; borrow a term from a foreign
language or some other source; lastly, alter the meaning of an old word.”). As Ullmann
recognized half a century ago, “[t]he need to find a new name is . . . an extremely important
cause of semantic changes.” Id. at 210.
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distracting courts from more critical inquiries.208 While it would be a mistake
for trademark disputes to depend entirely on the Abercrombie category to which
a mark is assigned, the spectrum maintains some surprising utility in identifying
the conceptual strength of trademarks. The application of linguistic theory and
cognitive research helps resolve some of the perceived conflict between the
formalism of the Abercrombie spectrum and the contextualism of standard
trademark critiques. At its core, the Abercrombie spectrum reflects solid
linguistic principles about how meaning is typically added to the lexicon. Many
critiques of the Abercrombie spectrum are thus overstated.209 However, while
the Abercrombie categories are generally consistent with our best understanding
of semantic shift, trademark law draws the boundary of inherent distinctiveness
in the wrong place.210
As discussed in Part III.C, recent cognitive experiments indicate that the
relationship between different meanings of the same word affect audience
comprehension and processing.211 Thus, the categorical differences in the
widely adopted Abercrombie spectrum, while not outcome determinative,
remain a useful starting point for understanding how consumers interact with
trademarks. The Abercrombie categories, which have had a substantial impact
on the development of trademark law, accurately reflect well-understood
differences between monosemes, homonyms, and polysemes. My scholarship is
the first to relate the Abercrombie categories to the regular forms of language
change they embody.212 Table 5 summarizes the discussion that follows,
charting the relationship between Abercrombie categories and linguistic
categories of new and ambiguous words.213

208 See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 123–32 and accompanying text (providing a summary of those

critiques).
210 See infra Part IV.B.
211 See supra Part III.C.
212 See generally Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1.
213 An earlier version of this table was first published in Linford, “Generic”
Trademarks, supra note 1, at 134–35. See generally id. for a critique of how “generic” terms
are not protected even when they acquire strong source significance.
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Table 5: Relationship Between Types of Language Change and Trademarks
Along the Abercrombie Spectrum
Semantic Category
(relationship between
existing
words/meanings and
new word/meaning)
Monoseme:
Only one meaning

Homonym:
No connection between
existing meanings and
the new meaning

Metaphor:
Figurative connection
between existing
meanings and the new
sense

Metonym:
Literal or contiguous
connection between
existing and new sense,
like feature for the
whole. Ex.: Green
Beret from distinctive
headgear worn by U.S.
Army Special Forces
shifts to serve as a
nickname for the
organization and its
members
Restriction:
Word formerly used to
describe general
category narrowed to
represent a prototypical
member of the category
Ex.: hound narrowed
from any dog to large
hunting dog

Legal Consequences
Abercrombie Spectrum
(relationship between mark and
product offered)

Protectability

Inherent
Strength

Fanciful mark:
Coined for use as a trademark,
not derived from a pre-existing
word
Ex.: XEROX for photocopiers
Arbitrary mark:
Derived from a pre-existing
word that has no connection
with the product sold
Ex.: APPLE for computers
Suggestive mark:
Pre-existing word with some
connection to the marked
product. Consumers make
connection between mark and
product via an “imaginative
leap” Ex.: SKINVISIBLE for
transparent adhesive bandages;
GLEEM for toothpaste

Inherently
protectable on
first use

Descriptive mark:
Pre-existing term with a clear
connection to the product sold,
via a direct description of a
product feature
Ex.: SEALTIGHT for fasteners

Protectable
only with
evidence of
source
significance

Presumed
weak

Ex ante generic mark:
Word whose meaning has
shifted from a class of products
to one particular brand.
Ex.: HOG for Harley Davidson
motorcycles denied protection,
despite evidence of shift, on
grounds of trademark
incapacity.

Unprotectable,
even with
evidence of
source
significance

Not
considered

Presumed
strong

Varies—some
courts
presume
suggestive
marks are
weaker than
arbitrary and
fanciful marks
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Generally, the phenomena observed in tracing semantic shift can also be
observed as firms seek to develop trademarks. Some trademarks are formed
from pre-existing words, while others are surprising and new. As the following
Sections explain in more detail, these Abercrombie categories (fanciful,
arbitrary, descriptive, and suggestive) each mirror a regular manifestation of
semantic change (monosemy, homonymy, metonymic polysemy, and
metaphoric polysemy). This overlap indicates that research into semantic shift
may provide valuable insight into the relationship between the Abercrombie
categories and the conceptual strength of trademarks. A thorough understanding
of this relationship is particularly important in light of the fact that trademark
plaintiff win rates generally mirror the conceptual strength traditionally assigned
to Abercrombie categories214: the “weaker” the mark, the fewer the cases won
by the plaintiff.215

1. Monosemous Fanciful Trademarks
At the strong end of the Abercrombie spectrum we find fanciful trademarks.
Unlike arbitrary and suggestive marks, fanciful marks are typically unrelated to
pre-existing lexemes. Words like XEROX216 and KODAK217 are “fanciful” in
origin because they are coined specifically for use as trademarks.218 It may seem
puzzling at first to describe the creation of a fanciful or coined mark as a
semantic shift because those marks are often described as made up from whole
cloth.219 Nevertheless, creating a fanciful mark requires forging a new word
from existing morphemes, the smallest building blocks of language. The process

214 Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 124, at 1637–38.
215 Id. Beebe discounted that result as turning on the way conceptual strength of a mark

feeds into commercial strength in the marketplace. Id. at 1639. Beebe’s dismissal might turn
in part on the failure of some courts to categorize marks in reported opinions as part of a
likelihood of confusion determination. Id. at 1635–36.
216 The term XEROX is ostensibly drawn from the technical name for the photocopying
process, xerography, itself derived from Greek words for “dry” and “writing.” SCM Corp.
v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 985 n.2 (D. Conn. 1978).
217 See History: George Eastman, KODAK, http://www.kodak.com/ek/us/en/corp/
aboutus/heritage/georgeeastman/default.htm [http://perma.cc/6VJJ-4G3A] (“I devised the
name myself. The letter ‘K’ had been a favorite with me—it seems a strong, incisive sort of
letter. It became a question of trying out a great number of combinations of letters that made
words starting and ending with ‘K.’ The word ‘Kodak’ is the result.” (quoting George
Eastman, founder of Kodak)).
218 Eve V. Clark & Herbert H. Clark, When Nouns Surface as Verbs, 55 LANGUAGE 767,
802 (1979) (“New technologies seem to be responsible for many of the denominal verbs that
are now very common—Xerox, telephone, wire, radio, and paperclip. In each case, a
complicated situation is expressed economically in a single verb.”).
219 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 11:4. There are some close calls where the creation of
some fanciful marks might seem homonymous. For example, Google selected its housemark
by misspelling googol, the designation for one followed by 100 zeros. Math geeks know that,
but many others do not.
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of creating a fanciful mark is essentially monosemous.220 The mark owner adds
an entirely new entry into the lexicon by coining a new word from raw linguistic
material to identify its product. A fanciful mark is inherently distinctive because
it has no other meaning, at least when initially coined.

2. The Natural Homonymy of Arbitrary Trademarks
Next on the Abercrombie spectrum we find arbitrary marks, where the word
selected as a mark has pre-existing meaning that is homonymous or unrelated
to the product designated.221 When establishing an arbitrary mark, the trademark
owner applies an existing word to a product for which the word has not been
commonly used and which neither suggests nor describes any ingredient,
quality, or characteristic of the product.222 For example, the word “apple” is
familiar to any English speaker, while the two-dimensional image of an apple
can cross linguistic barriers and bring to mind the fruit to any individual who
has seen an apple. When Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs first decided to sell
computers under the APPLE trademark, there was at least one established
meaning of “apple,” designating a category of fruit from a particular genus of
tree,223 but no sense of APPLE as a brand of computer hardware and software.
Neither the word apple nor the image of an apple brought to mind computers
and computer programs until Wozniak and Jobs began selling personal
computer kits in 1976 under the APPLE mark.224 Over time, the Apple
Corporation added a new meaning to the word apple. Establishing an arbitrary
trademark is thus a process of creating a new homonym: a new meaning for a
pre-existing word that is unrelated to that word’s established meanings.

220 See also Eric McCready, Unnatural Kinds, 40 J. PRAGMATICS 1817, 1819, 1821
(2008) (stating that trademarks “exhibit one property of quotations that has been extensively
discussed: TM takes (sequences of) words and treats them as (what amount to) singular
terms,” perhaps indicating that other “natural” and “unnatural kinds” should have a single
name, i.e., that “name-kind mapping should be one-one”).
221 See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text; see also Linford, “Generic”
Trademarks, supra note 1, at 136–37.
222 See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219,
1243 (D. Colo. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (quoting jury instruction
regarding the nature of an arbitrary mark).
223 Apple, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9678
[http://perma.cc/MJ2B-X7D8] (“The round firm fruit (a pome) of any of various wild and
cultivated trees of the genus Malus . . . occurring in a wide variety of forms, colours, and
flavours . . . .”).
224 OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL: THE REAL STORY OF APPLE
COMPUTER, INC. 7 (1999); Stephen Wozniak, Homebrew and How the Apple Came to Be, in
DIGITAL DELI (Steve Detlea ed., 1984), http://www.atariarchives.org/deli/
homebrew_and_how_the_apple.php [http://perma.cc/5AD7-CPK6]; see also APPLE,
Registration No. 1078312 (APPLE for computers and computer programs recorded on paper
and tape).
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3. The Metonymic Connection Between the Descriptive Mark and the
Product
As described in Part II.A, a descriptive mark “forthwith conveys an
immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”225
Because of this close connection between the mark and its source, descriptive
marks are not afforded a presumption of protectability. Instead, a descriptive
term must acquire source significance prior to protection as a trademark.
The product associated with a descriptive mark is related to the word or
words from which the mark is drawn in a manner that resembles metonymic
polysemy.226 A descriptive mark builds on a characteristic of the good or service
with which it is associated, while a metonymic shift is a change based on an
association or connection between concepts.227 The trademark owner seeks to
secure protection in a mark that best reminds consumers of the product offered
under the mark. For example, a term like SEALTIGHT for fasteners describes
a quality a fastener should possess, and is thus descriptive in nature.228 The
relationship between descriptive mark and product is contiguous and metonymic
like the relationship between the Green Beret nickname and the special forces
unit it identifies.229

4. The Metaphoric Connection Between the Suggestive Mark and the
Product
Like a descriptive mark, a suggestive mark is derived from a word with a
connection to the product identified. Instead of direct appropriation of a product
feature as a source signifier, a suggestive mark is indirectly related to a feature
of the product.230 For example, GLEEM for toothpaste evokes the way teeth
should shine after brushing, but the connection is not as direct as a word like
“clean.”231 Unlike a descriptive mark, the law treats a suggestive mark as
“inherently distinctive” because courts perceive the connection between the
mark and the product as so tenuous that consumers must make an imaginative
leap to link mark and product.232
225 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)

(quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
226 See also Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 138–39.
227 For instance, horn for “animal horn” added the sense of horn for “musical
instrument,” due to the use of some animal horns as musical instruments or warning devices.
Blank, Co-Presence, supra note 168, at 182; see also TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24,
at 28.
228 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001).
229 See supra notes 25, 172 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 25, 172 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 25, 172 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Suggestive marks occupy a midpoint between arbitrary and descriptive
marks along the Abercrombie spectrum and were recognized much later than
their categorical companions. Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act,
descriptive marks were incapable of acquiring trademark protection. What we
now call arbitrary and fanciful marks were protectable “technical” marks.233
Courts were split on what to do with terms that were not clearly arbitrary nor
exactly descriptive.234 For example, in Filley v. Fassett, the Supreme Court of
Missouri noted that terms which were “either descriptions or suggestive of the
style, character, or qualities of” the product could not be protected as a
trademark.235 On the other hand, in O’Rourke v. Central City Soap Co., the
district court opined that marks “suggestive of some supposed advantage to be
derived from using [the product], or some effect produced by its use [are]
ordinarily, though not always, upheld as valid trade-marks.”236 The law
eventually distilled around the notion that suggestive marks, like arbitrary and
fanciful marks, were inherently distinctive.237 But in light of semantic shift
research, suggestive marks likely fall short of inherently indicating source.
Thus, the courts made the wrong call.
The process of creating a suggestive mark mirrors metaphoric polysemy. A
suggestive mark is a type of metaphoric extension, not unlike the adoption of
the word crane, for ‘a long-necked fishing bird,’ to also identify a construction
machine with a long boom used to move heavy loads.238 Suggestive marks
operate in metaphoric relationship to the words from which they are drawn,239
requiring “the consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as to
the nature of the[] goods” offered under that mark.240 For example,
233 Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160
n.8.
234 Educ. Dev. Corp. v. Econ. Co., 562 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing Abercrombie
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976); and then citing Union
Carbide Co. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1976)).
235 Filley v. Fasset, 44 Mo. 168, 177 (1869).
236 O’Rourke v. Cent. City Soap Co., 26 F. 576, 578 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1885).
237 Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 135, at 564 n.74 (citing AMASA C. PAUL, THE
LAW OF TRADE-MARKS, INCLUDING TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 (1903)
(reporting on cases that treated a suggestive mark as a technical trademark)).
238 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
239 Metaphoric extensions are based on a specific analogous similarity between
concepts. GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 143, at 27.
240 Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (4th Cir. 1984)); see also TMEP, supra
note 20, § 1209.01(a) (“Suggestive marks . . . when applied to the goods or services at issue,
require imagination, thought, or perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of those
goods or services. . . . [A] descriptive term . . . immediately tells something about the goods
or services.”). As Judge Friendly wrote in Abercrombie, “[a] term is suggestive if it requires
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.”
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
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SKINVISIBLE was held to be suggestive for transparent adhesive bandages
because nothing about the name SKINVISIBLE directly evokes the quality of
adhesion.241 But SKINVISIBLE directly references the features of transparency
and the skin as the surface for adhesion. The “imaginative process” used by
consumers to connect a mark to the product sold is not like the process of
comprehending the natural homonymy of an arbitrary mark. An arbitrary mark
stands out because it is derived from a word entirely unrelated to the product
offered for sale.
The SKINVISIBLE mark is one of many for which the perceived distance
between the mark and the product identified is a matter of reasonable
disagreement.242 Courts are required to distinguish descriptive from suggestive
marks because the consequences are severe, but as the next Section makes clear,
trademark law mistakenly exaggerates the difference between suggestive and
descriptive marks. Semantic shift research indicates that a metaphoric polyseme
like a suggestive trademark enhances the connection between mark and product
through processing advantages similar to those provided by a metonymic
polyseme like a descriptive mark. In contrast, an arbitrary mark highlights the
connection between mark and source due to the lack of connection between
mark and product.

B. The Suggestive Mark, Cognitive Efficiency, and Inherent
Distinctiveness
This Article presumes that the dominant economic rationale—securing the
information transmission function of trademarks to economize consumer search
and reduce consumer confusion—is a sufficient normative justification for
trademark protection.243 This Section thus argues that the law correctly extends
protection on first use to a fanciful or arbitrary mark and correctly withholds
protection from a descriptive mark until there is evidence of source significance.
But the law errs in extending protection on first use to a suggestive mark.
241 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180 (C.C.P.A.

1972).

242 See supra Part II.B.
243 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. This Article also presumes that courts

are correct to construe marks as a whole, rather than considering their component parts. If
that presumption is relaxed, there are reasons to suspect that many marks currently
designated as fanciful are like descriptive marks to the extent that the individual sounds that
comprise those marks carry meaning that communicates product characteristics. See Linford,
Fanciful?, supra note 122 (arguing that in light of research into sound symbolism—how
individual units of sound bear meaning even in some nonsense words—the perceived
differences between descriptive marks and some fanciful marks may be overstated); see also,
e.g., Richard R. Klink, Creating Brand Names with Meaning: The Use of Sound Symbolism,
11 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2000) (reporting two studies in which respondents perceived
undisclosed products with imaginary brand names as likely to be smaller, faster, lighter
(weight), softer, and/or more feminine depending on the sounds comprising the imaginary
brand).
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According to the economic account, trademarks are protected so they can
(and to the extent that they) effectively transmit information about the source of
the product to consumers and markets.244 Trademarks are protected from
infringing uses so that consumers can rely on the mark to more easily find and
purchase the product they desire from the source they prefer. “Inherently
distinctive” trademarks are likewise protected from their first use in commerce
because the law views them as possessing an innate capacity to transmit
information about the source of the mark. Fanciful marks are inherently
distinctive because they are new words coined for use as a trademark. On first
use, a fanciful mark has no meaning other than its source signifying meaning.

1. Linguistic Evidence: Arbitrary Marks Are Inherently Distinctive
Arbitrary marks are also treated as inherently distinctive because there is no
connection between the word chosen as a mark and the product offered.
Linguists refer to such unrelated look-alike or sound-alike words as
homonyms.245 Diachronic and cognitive research suggests that homonymous
arbitrary marks are properly categorized as inherently distinctive because this
lack of connection has measurable effects on language change over time and on
how an audience processes ambiguity when a word’s multiple meanings are
unrelated.
Diachronic research, which considers change in meaning over time,
observes a resistance to homonymous change but a disposition toward
polysemous shift.246 Semantic shift is most commonly channeled towards
change that adds related meanings to existing words, rather than unrelated or
conflicting meanings.247 On the other hand, moving from one meaning to an
unrelated meaning for the same word is not cognitively efficient. The lack of
connection between the concepts impedes recognition and slows the ability of
the audience to process ambiguity.
Cognitive research likewise indicates that homonymy does not facilitate the
resolution of ambiguity. Homonyms offered no processing advantage compared
to control words.248 Study participants processed homonymous meanings like
they processed dissimilar and unrelated words, rather than as senses of the same
word.249 Participants appeared to treat two homonymous terms as entirely
distinct linguistic units. This research suggests it is difficult to simultaneously
construe an ambiguous word using two homonymous meanings.250 The brain

244 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
245 See supra Part IV.A.2.
246 See supra Part IV.A.2.
247 See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
248 See Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134, at 214.
249 Id. at 215.
250 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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treats them like conflicting meanings.251 Thus homonyms like bank for the land
bounding a river and for a financial institution are likely to be treated as entirely
different words, and exposure to one meaning can make it difficult to perceive
the other. Likewise, apple for fruit and APPLE for computers are likely to be
treated as entirely distinct concepts.
The addition of an unconnected meaning to a pre-existing word seems
somewhat unnatural, not unlike the scene in the movie Mean Girls where one
member of a clique tries to start the trend of using “fetch,” as in the phrase “That
is so fetch,” as a synonym for “cool” or “awesome.” She is quickly shot down
by the leader of the clique with a frosty “Stop trying to make ‘fetch’ happen. It’s
not going to happen.”252
The unfamiliar nature of a homonymous addition does not make the creation
of an arbitrary mark impermissible. Indeed, this jarring juxtaposition is what
makes the arbitrary mark inherently distinctive. The difficulty of making the
cognitive jump from an arbitrary mark to the associated product is a feature, not
a bug, in the trademark regime. The lack of connection between mark and
product helps the arbitrary mark stand out as a signifier of source.
Using apple to designate a computer is inherently distinctive because it is
difficult for the audience to process apple in the context of computer sales as
anything other than a new, source-signifying way to use a recognizable
combination of letters. That lack of relationship jars the audience in a way that
signals the word chosen does new work as a trademark—an identifier of
source—rather than to identify the product sold. The initial disconnect between
mark and product forces the public to see the term as a trademark. This
disconnect between original and new meanings suggests that consumers are
likely to see a trademark like APPLE for computers as inherently source
signifying, just as they see monosemous fanciful marks as inherently source
signifying.

2. Linguistic Evidence: Descriptive Marks Lack Inherent
Distinctiveness
Unlike an arbitrary mark, a descriptive mark is seen to lack the native
capacity to indicate source from first use. Under the current doctrine, a
descriptive mark, which is derived from a characteristic of the product offered
for sale, does not inherently distinguish source. Evidence from the semantic shift
literature supports this categorization. As discussed above, descriptive marks
have a metonymic relationship with the product offered.253 Semantic shift
literature shows that an audience can process ambiguity between polysemous

251 Some scholars even posit that homonymous meanings are stored as separate words
in the mental lexicon. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
252 MEAN GIRLS (Paramount Pictures 2004).
253 See supra Part IV.A.3.
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senses—especially between metonyms—more easily than it can process jarring
homonymous ambiguity.
First, the diachronic evidence suggests a preference for semantic shift where
there is a close metonymic connection between existing and new meanings. For
example, the shift in Gallic French from faisan for ‘pheasant’ to azan for
‘rooster’ added some ambiguity to language: sound-alikes can confuse an
audience. The shift was nevertheless preferable to the previous ambiguity
between gat for ‘rooster’ and for ‘cat.’254 Scholars like Geeraerts argue that an
addition of meaning that connects old and new meanings is conceptually
efficient, and thus more readily accepted by readers and listeners than
homonymous ambiguity.
Cognitive research also points to a connection between metonymic
meanings that helps the audience resolve ambiguity. As mentioned above, early
linguistic theories posited that any word with many meanings would be
recognized more easily than a word with a single meaning. Recent research has
refined that hypothesis. For example, Klepousniotou reports that when an
ambiguous word shares multiple related meanings, the word is easier for readers
and listeners to recognize. Study participants exposed to polysemes
demonstrated statistically significant advantages in processing ambiguity,
compared to their speed in processing other types of ambiguous or monosemous
words.255 This advantage aided participants in distinguishing real words from
random assortments of letters, and appeared to prime or subconsciously prepare
study participants to remember or recognize related meanings.256 Unlike
homonymous words, which convey no processing benefit and appear
unconnected in the minds of survey participants, the research suggests that
exposure to one meaning can trigger recognition of another related, or
polysemous meaning.257 The effect is strongest when there is a metonymic
connection between the meanings.258 The metonymic connection between
descriptive mark and product sold is sufficiently close that the law properly
concludes a descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive. Thus the law
appropriately requires evidence of acquired distinctiveness before protecting a
descriptive mark as a unique source signifier.

3. Linguistic Evidence: Suggestive Marks Are Not Inherently Distinctive
As discussed above, suggestive marks began as a makeweight between
descriptive and arbitrary marks.259 Courts wrestling with the question of how to
254 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
255 See Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134, at 212–17.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Study participants exposed to metonymic polysemes demonstrated clear processing

advantages, not only over control words in a variety of experimental settings, but also over
ambiguous homonyms and metaphoric polysemes. Id. at 214.
259 See supra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.
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treat a suggestive mark eventually grouped them with fanciful and arbitrary
marks. The law concedes a connection between the suggestive mark and the
product offered, which is strikingly similar to the connection between the
descriptive mark and the product sold. A descriptive mark lacks inherent
distinctiveness due to the connection between mark and product. But the law
perceives a larger gap between the suggestive mark and the product, a gap so
wide that courts and scholars refer to the “imaginative leap” that the consumer
must take to connect the mark to the product.260 The law thus designates the
suggestive mark as inherently distinctive, capable of standing out as a source
signifier from its first use in commerce.
Research into semantic shift indicates the current doctrine makes too much
of this imaginative leap. The case for treating a suggestive mark as inherently
distinctive is much weaker than the case for an arbitrary mark. Grouping
metaphoric suggestive marks with homonymous arbitrary marks indicates a
failure to recognize how an audience processes metaphors and homonyms. A
suggestive mark is less likely to be perceived as a source signifier from the
consumer’s first exposure, because the metaphoric connection between mark
and product has a stronger effect than the law currently recognizes. An arbitrary
mark is inherently distinctive because the lack of relationship is jarring. A
suggestive mark does not jar; it hints.
Like a descriptive mark, a suggestive mark is derived from a feature of the
product sold. A suggestive mark shares many properties with a descriptive mark.
Those similarities indicate that suggestive marks likely accelerate a connection
in the minds of consumers between mark and product more readily than between
mark and source.
Both descriptive and suggestive marks have a polysemous relationship to
the product offered,261 which semantic shift research indicates aids in
processing and recognizing multiple meanings. First, according to diachronic
research, a metaphoric relationship between two meanings of the same word is
cognitively efficient and thus a relatively easy form of ambiguity for the reader
or listener to process, much like a metonymic relationship. Semantic shift is thus
commonly channeled towards polysemous change, which includes metaphoric
shift. For instance, Geeraerts notes the cognitive efficiency of shifting away
from gat to represent both ‘cat’ and ‘rooster,’ and instead adding rooster as a
second meaning to bigey.262 Bigey already signified a parish curate, so the
addition of rooster decreased formal efficiency.263 Nevertheless, the metaphoric
connection between the behavior of a curate in his parish and a rooster in his
yard made the addition cognitively efficient.264
Second, cognitive research by Klepousniotou and others indicate that, like
metonyms, metaphors are processed as related senses of a single word stored
260 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
261 See supra Part IV.A.3–4.
262 See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
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together in the mental lexicon of the audience, and thus quickly accessed and
recognized.265 In other words, readers and listeners see metaphorically
connected meanings as different aspects of the same word. Klepousniotou
reports that in certain contexts, study participants exposed to metaphoric
polysemes process those words more easily than words with multiple
homonymous meanings, and more easily than words with one meaning.266
While the cognitive processing benefit conferred by metaphors is not as
consistent as the benefit conferred by metonyms, both types of polysemous
relationships confer processing benefits that a homonymous relationship does
not.
The diachronic and cognitive research indicates that the suggestive mark is
connected to the product offered through mechanisms that enhance product
salience more than source significance. The law may thus err in presuming that
a suggestive mark is inherently distinctive. If the economic search cost account
favors marks that are inherently distinctive with relatively automatic protection,
the law should not extend that favor to suggestive marks. In addition, the
effectiveness of the metaphoric connection between suggestive mark and
product may mean that suggestive marks benefit from some of the anticompetitive advantages that caution against automatic protection of descriptive
trademarks. The next Section considers this possibility.

4. Suggestive Marks and Cognitive Free Riding
Trademark law puts hurdles before the putative owner of a descriptive mark
because of the danger that the mark owner may be able to “free ride” on an
association between mark and product.267 As Lisa Ramsey notes, the descriptive
mark itself “is attribute-identifying . . . provid[ing] information about the
qualities and characteristics of the product.”268 This effect is independent of
concerns about language depletion.269 Whether or not the descriptive term is the
only or the best term available, the business that selects the descriptive term “is,
in effect, free-riding off the attribute-identifying value of the descriptive
term,”270 at least until the mark acquires distinctiveness. This benefit is
consistent with the significant advantage that metonymic polysemes convey in
processing linguistic ambiguity. It is thus reasonable to ask the mark owner to
establish some level of source significance before protecting the descriptive
mark. But as the semantic shift research indicates, the same processing
advantages manifest in metaphoric connections like the link between a
suggestive mark and the product offered. While a metaphoric connection is not
265 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
266 Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134, at 214–16.
267 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
268 Ramsey, supra note 94, at 1155.
269 See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text (providing a summary of language

depletion arguments).
270 Ramsey, supra note 94, at 1155.
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as obvious or quite as strong as a metonymic connection, it is often highly
effective at bringing connected meanings to mind. For a suggestive mark, the
metaphoric connection links mark and product, not mark and source. The
adoption of a suggestive mark may thus also trigger problematic free riding by
the mark owner,271 who may benefit from the tendency of consumers to embrace
metaphoric shift.
In light of the semantic shift research, the law should reconsider the
suggestive–descriptive line. Suggestive marks are not as naturally distinctive as
the law presumes. In fact, the suggestive–descriptive line may be difficult to
draw precisely because in many cases, the difference is more imagined than real.
Suggestive marks occupy the middle ground between arbitrary and descriptive
marks, but grouping suggestive marks with arbitrary marks is inconsistent with
current research on how those marks are likely to be processed. Thus, a
suggestive mark should not be treated as inherently distinctive. The following
table summarizes the findings and proposed changes to the law. The next
Section examines potential changes in more detail.
Table 6: Differences Between Descriptive, Suggestive, and Arbitrary
Trademarks in Light of Cognitive Literature
Abercrombie
Category

Linguistic
Relationship

Descriptive

Metonymic
Polysemy

Suggestive

Arbitrary

Metaphoric
Polysemy

Homonymy

Measured Processing
Advantage
Consistent processing
advantage in lexical
tasks
Significant
processing advantage
in lexical tasks in
some contexts
No processing
advantage in any
lexical tasks

Proposed Bar to
Protectability

High bar—proof
of source
significance

Low bar—
inherently
distinctive on
first use

C. Resetting the Inherent Distinctiveness Line
As summarized in Part III, research into language change tells us how and
why words gain new meanings, and how speakers and listeners deal with the
ambiguity created when a word means more than one thing. The previous
Section argued that a suggestive metaphoric mark is much less likely than an
arbitrary mark to instantly signal its status as a trademark. On the other hand, a
suggestive mark benefits from some of the same processing advantages as a
271 See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.
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descriptive metonymic mark.272 Thus, the law should not treat a suggestive
mark as inherently distinctive.
Recognizing that suggestive marks are not inherently distinctive should
drive several changes to the law. The most dramatic potential change would be
to treat only fanciful and arbitrary marks as inherently distinctive. A mark
derived from a pre-existing word would be treated as inherently distinctive, and
thus protected without evidence of source significance, only if there was no
connection between existing meanings or senses of the mark selected and the
product sold. Arbitrary marks would thus continue to be treated as inherently
distinctive, but suggestive marks would not. Suggestive marks would instead be
treated like descriptive marks. Protection would thus extend to a suggestive
mark only with some indication that the mark had acquired a secondary, sourcesignifying meaning. The inquiry could work as it currently works for descriptive
marks.273
Redrawing the suggestive–descriptive line would require a statutory
change. Currently, section 2 of the Lanham Act,274 the statute governing federal
trademark protection, states that a trademark cannot be refused registration
unless, inter alia, the mark is “merely descriptive of” the applicant’s product.275
A suggestive mark is not inherently distinctive, but courts and trademark
examiners would balk at defining it as “merely descriptive.” Thus, under the
current statute, a suggestive mark may be registered upon first use, and federal
trademark registration conveys nationwide rights in the mark.276 The statute
could be amended so that a trademark could be refused registration if the mark
either is not inherently distinctive or has not acquired secondary meaning, with
“inherently distinctive” defined as a mark with no inherent connection between
the product and mark selected (or more categorically, as an arbitrary or fanciful
mark).
Requiring evidence of source significance would delay some applications
for trademark protection.277 For many applicants, a denial on descriptiveness
grounds is overcome by waiting for five years. After five years of relatively
exclusive use, the law presumes that a descriptive mark has acquired
distinctiveness.278
But treating a suggestive mark exactly like a descriptive mark might be an
overcorrection. As discussed above, the cognitive research shows stronger and
more consistent processing advantages for metonymic polysemes than

272 See supra Part IV.B.
273 See supra Part II.A.
274 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
275 Id. § 1052(e)(1).
276 Id. §§ 1072, 1114.
277 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (noting

that “adding a secondary meaning requirement [to all claims of protectable trade dress] could
have anticompetitive effects, creating particular burdens on the startup of small companies”).
278 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
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metaphoric polysemes.279 While a suggestive mark is not inherently distinctive
like an arbitrary mark, it may not consistently convey the same processing
advantages as a descriptive mark. Thus it might be safe to protect a suggestive
mark earlier or more broadly than a descriptive mark, without protecting it from
first use in commerce. If so, the law might properly continue to differentiate
between suggestive and descriptive marks in some contexts.
If descriptive marks confer a greater processing advantage than suggestive
marks, even though the latter are not “inherently distinctive,” it could be
appropriate to set a lower bar for suggestive marks to acquire distinctiveness
than descriptive marks. This might be accomplished in trademark litigation by
imposing a lower standard for finding acquired source significance if the mark
is suggestive rather than descriptive.280 The law might also differentiate
between descriptive and suggestive marks in commercial strength inquiries that
constitute part of the standard trademark infringement analysis. For example,
courts are currently split over whether a suggestive mark is entitled to a
presumption of high commercial strength. A study conducted by Barton Beebe
suggests that likelihood of confusion increases as the inherent strength of the
mark increases along the Abercrombie scale. Beebe reported that courts found
likelihood of confusion more frequently in cases where the senior user’s mark
was categorized as suggestive compared to cases where the mark was
categorized as descriptive.281 Perhaps then a suggestive mark would have to
provide evidence of secondary meaning before qualifying for protection, but the
lack of direct connection between mark and product could serve as a thumb on
the scale in favor of commercial strength grounded in conceptual strength.
The law might also allow the mark owner to register a suggestive mark with
less evidence of source significance compared to, or after a shorter duration of
substantially exclusive use than a descriptive mark. Pursuant to section 2(f) of
the Lanham Act, substantially exclusive use of a descriptive mark for five years
279 See supra Part IV.B.
280 Some courts find that a survey response indicating between thirty to thirty-five

percent consumer recognition is sufficient to establish commercial strength for a suggestive
mark but insufficient for descriptive marks. See, e.g., Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan Inc., 975
F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1992).
281 Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 124, at 1638. The senior user won in nearly sixty
percent (.588) of the cases where the mark was categorized suggestive, and in roughly
twenty-five percent (.258) where the mark was categorized as descriptive. Courts concluded
that the senior user’s mark was strong in exactly the same proportion (.588 to .258). Id. A
follow-up study by Kevin Blum and his coauthors reported that there is not a significant
difference in how courts handle suggestive and descriptive marks in every context. See
generally Blum et al., supra note 124. For example, the Blum study reported a negative
correlation in Beebe’s data between a finding that the senior user’s mark is suggestive or
descriptive and a finding that the alleged infringer’s mark is similar to the plaintiff’s mark
and thus likely to confuse consumers. Id. at 24. Blum and his coauthors concluded that this
correlation might imply that courts require a similar degree of similarity between the senior
and junior marks in order to find that similarity favors a likelihood of confusion whether the
mark is suggestive or descriptive. Id.
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is prima facie evidence that the mark has acquired source significance.282 While
five years looks like a unitary term, trademark examiners are actually instructed
to apply differing levels of scrutiny to different types of marks when considering
a section 2(f) application to register a trademark. For example, applications to
register trade dress or marks derived from personal names do not automatically
benefit from the five-year presumption.283 The USPTO could likewise preserve
some space between descriptive and suggestive marks by internally
distinguishing between them. The five-year presumption in section 2(f) could
also be amended to allow the trademark office to accept fewer than five years
of substantially exclusive use as prima facie evidence that a suggestive mark has
acquired source significance.
Some scholars argue that despite its flaws, Abercrombie should be retained
as it stands because it serves as a good proxy for consumer perception in many
cases,284 and because the costs of changing the spectrum are too high.285 It is
true that requiring evidence of secondary meaning in more cases would not be
costless. Mark owners hoping to establish secondary meaning must gather
evidence of sales, advertising budgets, and the length of the mark’s relatively
exclusive use in the marketplace.286 Courts also expect consumer surveys to
establish source significance and those surveys can be expensive to generate.287
While these costs are not insignificant, requiring evidence of secondary
meaning before protecting a suggestive mark may not cost as much as some
critics fear. Many litigants already present consumer surveys into evidence
because without such evidence, some courts express skepticism of the litigant’s
claim.288 And requiring courts and examiners to distinguish between suggestive
and descriptive marks, as they must under the current regime, is also costly due
to the difficulty of drawing the suggestive–descriptive line.289 In fact, some
courts faced with classifying a mark along the suggestive–descriptive line
282 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
283 Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 52, at 724.
284 Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 135, at 558.
285 Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1283, 1290

n.41 (2011).
286 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir. 1976).
287 See, e.g., Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False
Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REV. 487, 519 (1993) (“The survey requires considerable time and
expert expenses that are not reimbursable as part of an award of costs.”); Rebecca Tushnet,
Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1305, 1340 (2011) (“[C]onsumer surveys are expensive, putting relief from truly
misleading claims out of the reach of smaller businesses.” (footnote omitted) (citing inter
alia Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, No. 90-4464, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19123, at *58
n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990) (stating that the 1990 cost of conducting a proper consumer
survey in a trademark dispute could reach $65,000))).
288 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468,
1478 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that absence of surveys is evidence that actual confusion
cannot be shown). But see A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th
Cir. 1986) (holding that survey evidence is not required to secure a preliminary injunction).
289 See supra Part II.
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prudentially assume the mark is descriptive and then analyze evidence of source
significance, perhaps to reduce the likelihood that the decision will be
reversed.290
While there is reason to doubt the inherent distinctiveness of a suggestive
mark, it is nevertheless possible that courts would resist even a modest change
to the status quo vis-a-vis suggestive marks.291 The law has treated suggestive
marks as inherently distinctive for so long that the contours of a direct inquiry
into whether a suggestive mark has acquired source significance might continue
to follow that predisposition. We might see the same resistance to change even
if Congress embraced one of the statutory revisions outlined above. The
phenomenon has been observed in other areas of intellectual property law. For
example, Clarisa Long has documented a tendency by federal courts to resist
application of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and refuse to find an
infringement of the anti-dilution right.292 Likewise, courts considering a
forfeiture of federal copyright protection under the 1909 Copyright Act
preferred to find that potentially divestive publication of a copyrighted work
was actually a disclosure to a limited group that did not foreclose subsequent
copyright protection.293
I make one other brief observation, which cannot be fully developed here.
If the status quo holds, and trademark law continues to treat suggestive marks
as inherently distinctive, the evidence on semantic shift should encourage mark
owners to pursue suggestive marks over descriptive marks. Lawyers frequently
council clients to select fanciful or arbitrary marks because if the mark is
contested during litigation, a costly inquiry into source significance can
sometimes be avoided.294 Marketing experts often counsel clients to do exactly
the opposite and select a mark as close to the generic line as possible because
those marks are seen as easier to fill with trademark meaning.295 Marketing
experts argue that a descriptive mark will help consumers make a connection
between product and source, and thus provide the mark owner with a leg up in
its communicative efforts. The literature on semantic shift indicates that the
metaphoric connection between a suggestive mark and the product sold can have
similar benefits. Producers might therefore benefit from selecting a suggestive
290 See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d
922, 936 n.16 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Even if ‘Lone Star’ were deemed descriptive, the evidence
of actual confusion certainly demonstrates that the mark has acquired secondary meaning in
this case.”).
291 Cf. Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 52, at 764–65.
292 Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2006).
293 Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 605–10 (2011); cf. Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the
Performativity of Remedies, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1149–50 (2013).
294 See, e.g., Julia Anne Matheson, Missing the Mark: The Top 10 Trademark Mistakes
in Advertising Campaigns, TRADEMARK WORLD, Oct. 2008, at 41, 44 (“While the selection
of a descriptive mark might make initial promotional efforts easier, it might prove a poor
decision in the long run due to the difficulty of enforcing the mark against competitors.”).
295 Id.
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mark that will more effectively connect the mark to the product sold than an
arbitrary mark, but in which it can secure protection more readily than in a
descriptive mark.296
For those worried about language depletion as the primary reason to cabin
protection for descriptive trademarks, a preference by producers for suggestive
over descriptive marks would also be welcome. While we lack evidence about
the ultimate number of potential suggestive marks that any mark owner could
adopt, it is likely more than the number of relevant descriptive marks.297 Thus,
encouraging mark owners to favor suggestive over descriptive marks might
reduce the threat of language depletion and the competitive harms that could
spring from protecting descriptive marks.
While I acknowledge the difficulty of implementing the proposals outlined
above, the semantic shift research calls into question the current protection of a
suggestive mark on its first use in commerce. Trademark law is justifiable to the
extent that it organizes the hierarchy of protection according to the processing
costs of building source significance in a given word chosen as a mark. But
trademark law draws too sharp a distinction between suggestive and descriptive
marks, ignores the processing advantage that a suggestive mark may provide,
and overestimates the ability of the suggestive mark to clearly signal source
significance from its first use in commerce.298 It may be possible to preserve
some differences between suggestive and descriptive marks, and treat
suggestive marks as a truly unique category. But if suggestive marks must be
categorized either with arbitrary and fanciful marks or with descriptive marks,
they should be classified with descriptive marks and denied protection until
there is evidence of source significance.

V. CONCLUSION
Trademark law awards protection based in large part on the inherent or
conceptual strength of the mark. Courts use the Abercrombie spectrum as the
main rubric for determining the conceptual strength of a given word mark.
Investing a trademark with source-signifying meaning is a type of semantic
shift, and research into semantic shift can thus clarify trademark law’s virtues
and limitations by providing a toolkit for reevaluating trademark law’s
presumptions about consumer perception.
While the Abercrombie spectrum has recently come under attack, semantic
research justifies a limited defense for the spectrum. The types of language
change recognized in the semantic shift literature, and the effects of different
types of ambiguous words on language processing, indicate there are
measurable differences in how consumers perceive words with multiple
meanings. So long as the Abercrombie spectrum aligns with those findings,
296 My thanks to Fred Abbott for his thoughts on this point.
297 See supra Part II.C.1.
298 Seth Oranberg provided a valuable sounding board for framing this argument.
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applying the spectrum will help trademark law meet its stated goal of reducing
consumer search costs by ensuring trademarks can communicate accurate
information about the source of the product, and therefore its quality, to
consumers. This analysis not only sheds new light on the continued viability of
the Abercrombie spectrum, but also highlights a key target for legal reform.
Semantic shift literature calls the current suggestive–distinctive line into
question.
The creation of a suggestive mark is a metaphoric semantic shift, which
trades on audience predisposition towards cognitive efficiency. The current
contours of the Abercrombie spectrum fail to recognize the power of that
connection. Trademark doctrine mistakenly lumps suggestive and arbitrary
marks together as inherently distinctive. The semantic shift literature provides
evidence that arbitrary marks likely stand out as source-signifying from their
first use in commerce. But the same is not true for suggestive marks. Suggestive
and descriptive marks are not identical, but their similarities outweigh their
differences, and those differences do not justify treating suggestive terms as
inherently distinctive. If trademark law aims to distinguish between marks that
automatically signal source and those that do not, and to require some evidence
of source significance before protecting a mark with a strong connection to the
product offered, then the inherent distinctiveness line should be redrawn.

